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Tenancy-in-common ownership represents the most widespread form of
common ownership of real property in the United States. Such ownership
under the default rules also represents the most unstable ownership of real
property in this country. Thousands of tenancy-in-common property
owners, including members of many poor and minority families, have lost
their commonly-owned property due to court-ordered, forced partition
sales as well as much of their real estate wealth associated with such
ownership as a result ofsuch sales.
This Article reviews and analyzes the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act (UPHPA), a uniform act that represents the most significant
reform to partition law in modern times. I served as the Reporter, the
person charged with principal responsibility for drafting a uniform act
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, for the UPHPA. The Article summarizes those aspects of
partition law that have resulted in thousands of property owners losing
millions of acres of property and the real estate wealth associated with
such property. The Article also provides an analysis of key sections of the
UPHPA, and this analysis makes clear that the UPHPA represents a very
comprehensive and innovative reform to what heretofore had long been
perceived to be the intractable problem of tenancy-in-common land loss.
To this end, the Council of State Governments elected the UPHPA as one
of thirty-five newly enacted statutes or uniform acts for inclusion in its
2013 Suggested State Legislation publication (from hundreds of
submissions by state officials from across the country) to encourage states
to consider it as a model. The UPHPA has been enacted into law in four
states, it was introduced for consideration in four other jurisdictions in
2014, and a number of states are on the cusp of introducing it for
consideration in 2015.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 2010, at its 119th Annual Meeting held in Chicago,
Illinois, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), also known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), voted to
approve the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA).' The
* Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to thank professors Bernadette
Atuahene, J. Peter Byrne, Scott Cummings, Nestor Davidson, Rashmi Dial-Chand, Wilson Freyermuth,
Lynn LoPucki, Shelley Saxer, Joseph Singer, and Dale Whitman, who each provided very helpful
comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank John Blimling, Monica Mark, and Richard
Davis for providing excellent research assistance as I developed this Article.
It is especially fitting that my Article is being published in the Alabama Law Review for a few
reasons. First, a few past and current faculty members at the University of Alabama School of Law have
played important roles in contributing to the development of the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property
Act or in its enactment into law in Alabama in 2014. Robert McCurley, a former longtime serving
member of the University of Alabama School of Law faculty played a critical role in serving very
capably as the chair of the Uniform Law Commission's drafting committee for the Act and he then
served as the Reporter for the Alabama Law Institute's committee that presented the Alabama Uniform
Partition of Heirs Property Act to the Alabama judiciary and the Alabama State Bar. Professor William
Henning has served as an Alabama commissioner for the Uniform Law Commission for a number of
years and he helped advocate for the Act at important junctures in its development. Professor Fredrick
Vars served on the Alabama Law Institute's advisory committee for the Alabama Uniform Partition of
Heirs Property Act. Second, in addition to these people, certain Alabama attorneys were particularly
active observers in the drafting of the Act and/or have played especially active roles in the efforts to
enact the Act into law both in Alabama and in states throughout the country. These attorneys are Craig
H. Baab, Carolyn Gaines-Varner, and John Pollock. Third, the publication of this Article in the
Alabama Law Review symbolizes how much recent progress has been made in the decades-long and
mostly uphill struggle to reform partition law, including within Alabama, especially taking into account
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drafting committee for the UPHPA, which included many leading attorneys
with expertise in real property matters, litigation, and legislative affairs,
spent more than three years drafting the Act.2 In addition to the members of
the drafting committee, the two American Bar Association (ABA) advisors
and a number of observers participated robustly and effectively in drafting
the Act. On February 14, 2011, at its Midyear Meeting in Atlanta,
that it was widely considered especially unlikely that Alabama would enact significant partition reform
into law up until just a year or two ago.
More generally, as the Reporter for the Act, I would like to thank all the people and
organizations that played a key role in developing the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, in
helping to get it enacted into law, and otherwise in championing it one way or another. I will more fully
acknowledge many of these people and organizations in a book about the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act that I am editing, which will be published by the American Bar Association in 2015. Still,
at this time, I would like to thank the Uniform Law Commission for making the Act possible and for all
the substantial work it has done and is doing to enact it into law in states throughout the country. I also
would like to thank the American Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law and
Section of State and Local Government Law, the co-sponsors of this forthcoming book, for all of the
generous, consistent, and truly invaluable support hese two sections have provided to those of us who
participated in the drafting of the Act, to those who have been working hard to get it enacted into law,
and, more generally, to those who own heirs property.
I. See UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROP. ACT (2010), [hereinafter UPHPA], available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20of%20heirs%2Oproperty/uphpa fin l_10.pdf.
Each of the ULC's forty-nine "state commissions" present during the roll call of the states voted to
approve and adopt the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act as a uniform act and to recommend it for
enactment in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
United States Virgin Islands, which are the jurisdictions from which the ULC draws its commissioners.
E-mail from Kristina Shidlauski, Publications Manager, Uniform Law Commission, to Thomas W.
Mitchell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. (July 15, 2010, 16:52 CST) (on file with author).
The four delegations that did not vote on any uniform acts (including the UPHPA) at NCCUSL's 2010
Annual Meeting were Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. E-mail from Kristina
Shidlauski, Publications Manager, Uniform Law Commission, to Thomas W. Mitchell, Professor of
Law, Univ. ofWis. Law Sch. (July 18, 2010, 11:27 CST) (on file with author).
2. The drafting committee consisted of Robert L. McCurley, Chair; William R. Breetz; George H.
Buxton; Ellen Dyke; Lani L. Ewart; Peter F. Langrock; Carl H. Lisman; Marian P. Opala; Rodney W.
Satterwhite; Nathaniel Sterling; M. Gay Taylor-Jones; and Thomas W. Mitchell, Reporter.
3. Phyliss Craig-Taylor, now dean at North Carolina Central University School of Law, and
Steven J. Eagle, a law professor at George Mason University School of Law, served as American Bar
Association Advisors. The observers included a number of representatives from the Heirs' Property
Retention Coalition (HPRC), a coalition of public interest, civil rights, and community-based
organizations that was formed specifically to participate in the drafting of the Act. Individuals who
represented different organizations in the coalition who participated particularly actively in the drafting
process included Craig H. Baab from Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Inc., Carolyn
Gaines-Varner from Legal Services Alabama, and John Pollock from the Public Justice Center. John
also was the founder and remains the coordinator of the Heirs' Property Retention Coalition. Greg D.
Peterson, initially from DLA Piper and then from Tarlow, Breed, Hart & Rodgers, was an observer who
served as pro bono counsel for HPRC. Other active observers included Faith Rivers-James from Elon
University School of Law and Gregory M. Stein from the American College of Real Estate Lawyers
and the University of Tennessee College of Law. Finally, there were other observers, including
representatives from the American Association of Realtors and the American Bankers Association, who
did not participate actively in the drafting of the Act.
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Georgia, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved the UPHPA as
appropriate legislation for states to consider enacting into law.4
The Act primarily seeks to address the problem many families who
own tenancy-in-common property under the default rules have experienced
with respect to maintaining their real property, or at least the real estate
wealth associated with such property, after one or more cotenants eek to
exit the common-ownership arrangement by filing a lawsuit known as a
partition action. Though many of the families who own tenancy-in-
common property who have been most at risk of losing their property and
real estate wealth as a result of partition actions are African-American, a
large number of families outside of the African-American community have
also faced severe problems with partition actions. As compared to the legal
rules governing exit from many other common-ownership forms, including
forms under which people commonly own real property, tenancy-in-
common ownership under the default rules represents a particularly
unstable form of ownership.s This fact is significant given that tenancy-in-
common ownership is the most prevalent form of common ownership of
real property in the United States.
Such instability arises from the fact that, under the default rules,
cotenants possess a nearly unqualified right to file a partition action and to
request that a court resolve the partition action by ordering that the property
be sold at a forced partition sale.6 Many speculators-whether individuals
or businesses-over an extended period of time, have acquired very small
interests in family-owned, tenancy-in-common properties and have shortly
thereafter filed partition actions requesting courts to order the entire
properties forcibly sold.! Courts in jurisdictions throughout the country
often resolve partition actions by ordering a forced partition sale of the
property despite the fact that a clear majority of jurisdictions maintain a
statutory preference for a remedy referred to as a partition in kind. When a
court orders partition in kind, the property is divided into separately titled
parcels, which the court then allocates among the former cotenants, which
means that the cotenants retain important property rights at the conclusion
of the partition action.8
4. Before working vigorously to enact into law any uniform act it promulgates, the Uniform Law
Commission submits uniform acts it has promulgated to the American Bar Association for its approval.
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 91 (1991); James C. Dezendorf, The
Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 47 A.B.A. J. 909, 911 (1961).
5. Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race,
and the "Double Discount, " 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 589, 616 (2009).
6. Id. at 610.
7. Todd Lewan & Dolores Barclay, Quirk in the Law Strips Blacks of Land, TENNESSEAN, Dec.
11, 2001, at 8A.
8. Mitchell, Malpezzi & Green, supra note 5, at 610.
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Not only do court-ordered partition sales undermine property rights for
many low- to moderate-income property owners, but also many, if not
most, partition sales end up stripping such property owners of much of their
wealth that had been associated with the common property they had owned
that was ordered sold. Ironically, many courts that resolve partition actions
by ordering partition sales claim that such forced sales serve the economic
interest of all of the cotenants.9 These courts wrongly assume in many, if
not most, cases that all the cotenants will derive more economic value from
a forced sale of the entire property than from an in-kind division of the
property based upon the premise that the property as a whole has
economies of scale that buyers would value.
The UPHPA represents the most comprehensive and significant
innovation in modem times to the current state law of partition, at least
insofar as that law applies to partition actions involving family-owned,
tenancy-in-common property, which is referred to as "heirs property" under
the Act.10 The Act establishes a hierarchy of remedies that both reinforces
the property rights of certain tenancy-in-common property owners who
traditionally have been most at risk of losing their property at a forced
partition sale and significantly improves the ability of these tenancy-in-
common property owners to maintain their real-estate-based wealth should
a court order such a forced partition sale. 1 Though many of the UPHPA's
provisions represent some significant reform to partition law for most
jurisdictions, three specific provisions stand out. First, the UPHPA
provides cotenants who did not request the court to order a forced sale of
commonly-owned property with the opportunity to buy out the interests of
any cotenant that did request the court to order a forced sale of the
property. Second, unlike the general partition law in almost every state in
which there is an ostensible preference for partition in kind, the Act adds
real substance to the preference for a physical division of the property as
the preferred remedy as opposed to a forced sale of the property. Third, the
Act seeks to ensure that the wealth-maximization goal, which many courts
invoke as a justification for ordering a forced partition sale, can be much
better realized by the substantial reforms the Act makes to the sales process
most states use for partition sales.
In drafting the UPHPA, the drafting committee drew upon many
different sources of law. For example, the drafting committee considered a
wide range of both substantive and procedural state laws as well as some of
the private ordering strategies that people who own real property jointly
with others and who are wealthy or legally savvy often utilize, in part to
9. Id. at 613.
10. See infra Part V.A for definition of "heirs property."
11. See UPHPA, supra note 1, §§ 7-10, at 15-29.
6 [Vol. 66: 1:1
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make their ownership more secure.12 Further, the UPHPA is one of the few
purely domestic uniform acts that the Uniform Law Commission has
promulgated that draws upon laws from other countries, if only in a
somewhat limited way.'3 To be specific, the UPHPA's drafting committee
drew upon some of the private law from other countries governing common
ownership of real property, including some aspects of partition law from
Australia, Canada, and Scotland, among other countries.
Since the ABA approved the UPHPA in 2011, the Act has garnered
some significant support. From hundreds of newly enacted statutes or
model statutes submitted by state officials for consideration, the Council of
State Governments selected the UPHPA as one of thirty-five legislative
acts that it featured in its Suggested State Legislation publication for 2013
based upon its view, among other considerations, that the UPHPA
constitutes a very innovative and comprehensive act that addresses a
complex issue of regional or national significance.14 It has also been
endorsed by a number of state, regional, and national organizations.'5
Alabama, Georgia, Montana, and Nevada have enacted the UPHPA into
law, and it was also introduced for consideration in 2014 by legislatures in
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and South Carolina.16 These
early enactments and introductions are notable given that NCCUSL
historically has had mixed success with respect to convincing states to
enact its real property acts.17
12. See, e.g., UPHPA, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. 1; id. § 9 cmt. 1; id at Prefatory Note, at 3.
13. Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 198, 212
(1977) (noting that outside of uniform acts that involve subject matter that inherently implicates the
laws of other countries such as the enforcement of foreign judgments or reciprocal enforcement of child
support orders, the Uniform Law Commission's drafting committees have drawn upon laws outside of
the United States only in an episodic way). At the same time, in the past fifteen to twenty years,
NCCUSL has become increasingly involved in international and transnational legal matters. For
example, it has formed a strong relationship with the United States Department of State, has established
a Committee on International Legal Developments, and has created, along with the American Bar
Association, a Joint Editorial Board for International Law. Merle H. Weiner, Codification, Cooperation,
and Concern for Children: The Internationalization of Family Law in the United States over the Last
Fifty Years, 42 FAM. L.Q. 619, 657 (2008).
14. See 72 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 5, 9 (2013).
15. See Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of/o2OHeirs%2OProperty%/o2OAct (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
16. See id.
17. Some of the Uniform Law Commission's real property acts have been enacted into law in a
substantial number of states. These include the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, the
Uniform Environmental Covenants Act, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, and the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. In contrast, some others have not been adopted by any states over
a significant period of time. These include the Uniform Land Transactions Act, the Uniform Land
Security Interest Act, and the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act. Of course, a number of the
Uniform Law Commission's real property acts fall between these extremes as these acts have been
adopted in at least some minority of states. For example, the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act has
been enacted into law in five states since it was promulgated in 2005.
2014] 7
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of tenancy-in-common
ownership. This Part also demonstrates how courts have been very flawed
in assuming that partition sales are wealth maximizing in the light of the
below market value or even fire sale prices that partition sales often yield
and in consideration of the transaction costs associated with such forced
partition sales. Part II establishes the fact that low- to moderate-income
tenancy-in-common owners have experienced and continue to experience
particular problems with tenancy-in-common ownership in general and
with partition actions more specifically. Part III provides some history of
the mostly unsuccessful efforts to reform partition law in the forty to fifty
years preceding the promulgation of the UPHPA as well as some
background on how the ULC decided to form a drafting committee in an
effort to reform partition law. Part IV of this Article provides an analysis of
key sections and provisions of the UPHPA, demonstrating how innovative
and comprehensive the UPHPA is in terms of addressing some of the
longstanding problems many property owners have had with partition
actions. The Article concludes by providing some information on one
important reform idea that did not survive the drafting process and by
indicating what type of initiatives or reforms could build upon the
UPHPA's success in making tenancy-in-common ownership more viable
for a much larger number of property owners across the United States.
I. OVERVIEW OF TENANCY-IN-COMMON OWNERSHIP
A. General Characteristics
The tenancy in common is a form of common ownership of property
that appears to have first arisen in England in the fourteenth century.
England, however, effectively abolished the tenancy-in-common form of
ownership in its classic legal form in 1925 after the English Parliament
enacted the Law of Property Act 1925.19 As in the United States, many
other countries with legal systems rooted in the English common law
recognize the tenancy-in-common form of ownership.20 A tenant in
common owns an undivided, fractional interest in a parcel of property and
21may use and possess the entire property, provided he does not oust a
18. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 5.2, at 176 (3d ed.
2000).
19. C. J. Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating
Royalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TEX. L. REv. 369, 402 n.103 (1954).
20. Australia, for example, recognizes the tenancy-in-common form of ownership. See, e.g.,
Sacks v Klein [2011] VSC 451 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 13 Sept. 2011) (Austl.).
21. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETrA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
380 (1st ed. 2009).
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fellow cotenant who also seeks to use and possess the property.2 2 A
cotenant may transfer his interest by conveyance, will, or intestacy.2 3
In the United States, the tenancy in common is the most common
concurrent ownership form with respect to the ownership of real property2 4
for several reasons. First, a conveyance or devise of real property to two or
more people creates a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy unless
the conveyance or will expressly declares an intention to create a joint
25tenancy, or unless the conveyance or devise is to a husband and a wife in
a jurisdiction that still recognizes the tenancy by the entirety (provided that
there is no intention in these circumstances to create a tenancy in common
or a joint tenancy).2 6 Second, the tenancy in common is the default
ownership structure the law assigns to two or more people who qualify as
heirs who inherit an intestate decedent's real property under intestacy laws
in states throughout the country.27 In addition to these rules, which may in
fact create tenancy-in-common ownership in some circumstances in which
it was not specifically intended, many people also agree to structure their
real property ownership under a tenancy in common.
B. Partition Actions
1. Background and Scope of a Cotenant's Right to Seek Partition
Under a tenancy in common, there is unity of possession, which means
that each cotenant is entitled to possess the entire property subject to the
identical possessory rights each other cotenant has as well, unless some
private agreement among the cotenants provides otherwise.28 If the unity of
possession in a tenancy in common is destroyed, the tenancy terminates.
Destruction of the unity of possession can happen in several ways.2 9 A
tenancy in common automatically ends if all of the common owners convey
22. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.8, at 203-04.
23. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 21, at 380.
24. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.2, at 176; RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 594 (1968).
25. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.2, at 178. See, e.g., Riggs v. Snell, 352 P.2d
1056, 1057 (Kan. 1960) (noting that to overcome the presumption of a tenancy in common, "the
language used in a grant or devise must make it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created").
26. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.5, at 193.
27. 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 11 (2012). Real property can be transferred by intestate
succession when a person dies without a will and leaves heirs or when a will is not probated in a timely
way. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 72-73 (6th ed. 2000).
28. Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant Possession
Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 331, 339 (1994); Frank W.
Hammett, Tenancy in Common - Remedy of Cotenant Against Cotenant, 33 MARQ. L. REv. 257, 257
(1950).
29. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 40 (2012).
2014] 9
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their interests in the common property, voluntarily or involuntarily, to a
third person or if one cotenant acquires the interest or interests of all of the
other cotenants.30 Second, adverse possession will terminate a tenancy in
common. 31  Third, a tenancy in common will end if the cotenants
voluntarily agree to partition the property into two or more separately titled
estates or if a court orders partition of the property.32
In terms of the scope of a cotenant's right to seek judicial partition, a
cotenant possesses a near universal right to file a partition action because
restrictions on the ability of a cotenant to file a partition action normally
33constitute an unlawful restraint on alienation. A cotenant's right to file a
partition action does not depend upon the magnitude of her ownership
interest or the length of time she has owned her interest. Even a cotenant
who has only recently acquired a very small fractional interest-even a l
percent or less undivided interest-in tenancy-in-common property that
members of a family (or some other group for that matter) have owned for
generations, may file a partition action in most circumstances,34 without
consulting with his or her fellow cotenants.
In some circumstances, cotenants often expressly or impliedly agree
that none of the cotenants shall have an unrestricted right to file a partition
action, and in other instances a person who creates tenancy-in-common
ownership among others by devise or by conveyance, for example,
expressly restricts the right of any of the cotenants to partition the
property.s Courts generally uphold these types of agreements or
30. 4 ILLINOIS REAL PROPERTY § 29:8 (2012).
31. Id. Adverse possession can terminate tenancy-in-common ownership in at least three ways
depending upon in which jurisdiction such a claim may arise. First, someone who is a complete stranger
to title can adversely possess property owned by a group of cotenants under a claim of right if she can
prove all of the elements of adverse possession against the cotenants as a whole. Cf Rhodes v. Cahill,
802 S.W.2d 643, 644-47 (Tex. 1990) (finding the adverse possessor had not sufficiently proven the
elements of adverse possession to take title to property owned by numerous heirs to the original title
holder). Second, in a large number of states, a conveyance by one cotenant to a stranger to title, by an
instrument that purports to transfer the entire parcel in severalty to the grantee and not just the
cotenant's undivided interest, will enable the grantee to claim adverse possession under color of title if
subsequent o the conveyance the grantee fulfills all of the elements for adverse possession under color
of title. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 204 (2014). Third, if a cotenant in sole possession of
tenancy-in-common property ousts or commits some act that can be deemed the equivalent of an ouster
with respect to all of his fellow cotenants, such a cotenant can adversely possess property against his
fellow cotenants in many jurisdictions thereby overcoming the presumption that such a cotenant's sole
possession of the property is not adverse to the interests of his fellow cotenants. See generally W.W.
Allen, Annotation, Adverse Possession Between Cotenants, 82 A.L.R.2D 5 § 13 (1962).
32. 4 ILLINOIS REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30.
33. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.11, at 216; see also POWELL & ROHAN, supra
note 24, at 607; HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, 2 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 474 (3d ed. 2014).
34. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in
Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, Reconstruction].
35. TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 33, § 474.
10 [Vol. 66: 1:1
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restrictions that limit the ability of a cotenant to file a partition action,
provided that the restriction only constitutes a partial restraint on alienation
that remains in effect for a "reasonable time." 3 6 For example, many
investors acquire fractional interests in tenancy-in-common property in
order to qualify for the like-kind exchange provision of § 1031 of the
Internal Revenue Code, a provision that permits investors to defer taxes on
the exchange of real property. In acquiring such fractional interests, the
investors are nearly always subject to agreements that restrict their right to
seek to partition the property. The IRS has ruled that these restrictions are
lawful provided they "are required by a lender and . .. are consistent with
customary commercial lending practices."
2. Methods a Court May Use to Partition Tenancy-In-Common
Property
Legal commentators and courts often focus on just two of the remedies
that a court can order in resolving a partition action. These remedies,
partition in kind and partition by sale, certainly are the predominant
remedies courts consider in partition cases. Nevertheless, a review of the
law in states throughout the country reveals a surprising range of remedies,
including some that have received little attention from legal scholars, that
courts can order in partition actions. One might expect that this range of
possible remedies would enable these courts to resolve partition actions in
very equitable ways tailored to the specific circumstances of individual
cases.
Despite the theoretical availability in most jurisdictions of remedies
that fall somewhere between the binary options of just partition in kind or
just partition by sale, in recent decades, courts have tended to underutilize
some of these intermediate remedies. This development has resulted in
fewer courts ordering partition in kind and many more courts ordering
partition by sale.40 Though there is no research that provides a definitive
36. Wade R. Habeed, Contractual Provisions as Affecting Right to Judicial Partition, 37
A.L.R.3D 962, § 8a (1971); see also TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 33.
37. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2008).
38. Rev. Proc. 6-6, 2002-22 I.R.B. 733.
39. There is some legal precedent for the proposition that courts of equity have some very limited
discretion to refuse to partition property in any way but only "in extreme cases or where manifest
injustice, fraud or oppression will result if partition is granted." See, e.g., Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So.
2d 423, 427 (Fla. 1957); see also Newman v. Chase, 359 A.2d 474, 479 (N.J. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Faith Rivers, Inequity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs'
Property Owners Facing Partition in Equity, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 76 (2007); John G.
Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies,
27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 778 (1986). Some courts have simply stated that most courts in partition actions
are unable to partition property in an equitable way which explains why courts typically end up
ordering partition sales. See, e.g., Ragland v. Walker, 387 So. 2d 184, 185 (Ala. 1980) ("Except in the
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explanation for the reasons courts have decreased their use of intermediate
remedies in partition actions, certain well-respected commentators have
suggested that courts have ordered partition by sale with greater frequency
over the past several decades in substantial part because it is simply a much
easier remedy for a court to order.41 Others have suggested that as courts
have increasingly considered real property to be a fungible commodity,
courts in partition actions have become less concerned about protecting the
non-economic values that many cotenants in such actions seek to preserve
by requesting courts to order partition in kind.42
The following paragraphs describe some of the remedies available to
all or at least some state courts in partition actions, irrespective of whether
courts actually use these remedies to any considerable degree.
a. Partition in Kind or Partition by Sale
A clear majority of states maintain a statutory preference for a partition
in kind. In these states, partition statutes indicate that a court may order a
partition sale only if partition in kind would result in "great prejudice" or
"manifest prejudice" or "substantial injury" (or some other similar
formulation of an injury requirement) to the cotenants as a whole.43 No
matter how any given state formulates the injury requirement, hardly any
state legislatures have developed any specific criteria that a court must
consider before ordering a partition by sale.
Instead, even in jurisdictions with a statutory preference for partition in
kind, courts have increasingly undermined the statutory preference for
partition in kind by ordering partition sales in cases in which the property
was easily divisible. To this end, many of these courts have ordered a
partition sale after applying a very narrow, economics-only test.44 In
applying it, courts give little, if any, weight to claims made by cotenants
who seek a division in kind that the property holds substantial
rarest of circumstances which permit judicial equitable partition, the usual end result of such
proceedings is the passing of title to a stranger.").
41. See Lewan & Barclay, supra note 7.
42. Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 510.
43. It should be noted that in many if not most jurisdictions, courts may order a mixed remedy,
under which they divide part of the property in kind and order the remainder sold. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 872.830 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 103 (1995). However, in a limited
number of other states, a court may only order either partition in kind or partition by sale of the whole
property. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Conn. 2000).
44. See, e.g., Ashley v. Baker, 867 P.2d 792, 796 (Alaska 1994) (noting that "[tihe consensus
view is that 'great prejudice' refers to economic harm") (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.290 (2012)).
Though these economics-only tests have mostly been developed by state judges, some state partition
statutes also mandate that primarily economic considerations should be used to determine whether
partition in kind would result in great prejudice or substantial injury to the cotenants. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (2013).
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noneconomic value for them.45 Under the economics-only test, a court will
order a sale if the hypothetical fair market value of the entire property is
significantly more than the aggregated fair market value of separately titled
parcels which would arise from a partition in kind.46
b. Owelty
In many jurisdictions, in cases in which courts cannot practicably
divide the property in such a way as to give each cotenant his fair share,
courts have ordered owelty payments,47 which require a cotenant who
receives more than his pro rata share of the property to pay a cotenant who
receives less than his pro rata share monetary compensation so that the
partition is just.48 Though courts may order owelty primarily in partition
actions, the concept that cash should be paid to balance an otherwise
unequal exchange is common in various areas of business law. In the
commercial law area, including cases involving real estate transfers, courts
may order equalizing payments known asboot.4 9
c. The Buyout Remedy
Third, in approximately fourteen states, a court can grant one or more
of the parties the opportunity to buy out, at a price determined by the court
in most instances, some or all of the ownership interest of another
cotenant.50 Though often alluded to as a buyout remedy, this remedy is also
referred to as partition by allotment in a few jurisdictions.51 The states that
provide for buyouts view such buyouts as more consistent with the
preference for partition in kind than with partition by sale of the entire
property at public auction, even though one or more cotenants may have
their interests liquidated against heir will. 52 These states also believe that
certain cotenants may have superior equitable claims to maintaining
ownership of the property as a whole.53 The scope of the buyout remedy,
45. See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial Partition,
Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 737, 764 (2000).
46. See Ashley, 867 P.2d at 796.
47. See, e.g., Chesmore v. Chesmore, 484 P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1971).
48. Keenan v. Wade, 182 P.3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (Alaska 2008).
49. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Colonial Terrace Assocs., 656 P.2d 807, 809 (Mont. 1982).
50. This remedy is distinguished from the equitable remedy of owelty in almost every jurisdiction
by the fact that in ordering a buyout, a court may grant one cotenant the opportunity to buy out all of
another cotenant's interest or all of the interests of all of the other cotenants. See, e.g., Onderdonk v.
Onderdonk, 307 A.2d 710, 712-13 (Md. 1973); see also 68 C.J.S. Partition § 142 (2014).
51. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-50 (2005 & Supp. 2013); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71(f)(4); see also
Zimmerman v. Marsh, 618 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. 2005).




including which cotenants may be given the opportunity to utilize this
remedy, can differ substantially among the jurisdictions that recognize this
remedy.
1. States Limiting Buyout Remedy to Nonpetitioning
Cotenants
Georgia,54 Louisiana,5 and South Carolina56 are states that restrict the
buyout remedy by statute to parties that are not deemed to be parties that
petitioned a court to partition commonly-owned property, irrespective of
whether the petitioning cotenant requested partition in kind or partition by
sale. There are, however, significant differences among these three state
statutes. For example, unlike Louisiana and South Carolina, Georgia
permits a party that had petitioned a court for partition to "withdraw as
petitioner in the partition action and become a party in interest and any
party in interest. . . [to] become a petitioner in the action."58 In Georgia, a
party that withdraws as a petitioner and thereby becomes a nonpetitioning
party or a party in interest is then eligible to buy out the interest of any
remaining petitioner. Therefore, this provision of the Georgia statute in
effect transforms what may appear to be a potentially compulsory buyout
into a voluntary buyout.
Moreover, the Georgia and Louisiana statutes referred to above have
significant limitations that considerably narrow the circumstances under
which parties that did not petition the court for partition may be able to buy
out the interest of a petitioning cotenant. Both states only permit the buyout
remedy to be used in partition actions in which courts have determined that
partition in kind is not feasible.59 In Georgia, a nonpetitioning cotenant who
is referred to as a party in interest may only pay "in proportion to that
party's share of the total shares of property of all parties in interest, unless
one party in interest authorizes another party in interest to pay some or all
of his proportionate share of the shares available for sale."60 As a result of
this provision, the buyout remedy may fail if just one nonpetitioning
cotenant does not pay his or her share of the purchase price into the court
and also does not authorize another nonpetitioning cotenant to pay his or
54. GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-6-166.1 (2010 & Supp. 2014).
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1113 (2008 & Supp. 2014).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-25 (2005 & Supp. 2013).
57. Before Oregon revised its buyout statute in 2001, Oregon also had restricted the buyout
remedy to owners "'objecting to the partition or sale."' See Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d 1117, 1124 (Or.
Ct. App. 1998) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.210 (1997) (amended 2001)).
58. GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-6-166.1(d).
59. Id. § 44-6-166.1(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1113(A).
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-166.1(e)(2).
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her share of the purchase price.6 1 In Louisiana, only the interest or interests
of a co-owner or co-owners that (a) petitioned the court to partition the
property and (b) own either "an aggregate interest of fifteen percent or less
of the immovable property or an aggregate interest of twenty percent or
less of the immovable property if there was past ownership of the whole by
a common ascendant" are subject to being bought out by the nonpetitioning
co-owners, provided that the court determines the property is not
susceptible to partition in kind.62
South Carolina provides the most robust buyout rights to tenants in
common that had not petitioned a court for partition at any time. In South
Carolina, these nonpetitioning cotenants are afforded the right to buy out
the interests of any cotenant that petitioned a court for partition, and the
statute does not make this buyout right contingent upon the determination
of a court that the property is not susceptible to division in kind.63 Unlike
the Georgia statute, the South Carolina statute does not specify whether and
under what conditions a nonpetitioning cotenant may acquire more than his
pro rata share of the nonpetitioning cotenants' interests that are subject to
being bought out. In South Carolina, it appears that the consequences of a
failed buyout may be high because the statute indicates that in such a
circumstance "the court shall proceed according to its traditional practices
in partition sales" even though the statute does not require a court to have
determined that the property could not have been partitioned in kind before
nonpetitioning cotenants are given the opportunity to buy out interests of
petitioning cotenants.64 However, it is hard to predict how a South Carolina
court would rule with respect to the consequences of a failed buyout under
this relatively new statute as there still are no reported decisions in South
Carolina on this statute.
2. States That Grant Courts Discretion to Give Petitioning or
Nonpetitioning Parties the Chance to Buy Out Other
Cotenants
Unlike the small number of states that permit those cotenants that did
not petition a court to partition some parcel of real property the opportunity
as a matter of right to buy out a petitioning cotenant, a larger number of
states give courts the discretion to decide whether to grant any cotenant in a
partition action an opportunity to buy out a fellow cotenant even if the
61. Id. § 44-6-166.1(e)(l)-(2).
62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1113(A).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-25(A) (2005 & Supp. 2013).
64. Id. § 15-61-25(E).
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cotenant to be bought out would not otherwise consent to such a sale.65 The
states that permit courts to grant any cotenant in a partition action the
opportunity to buy out another cotenant do so in a few different ways.
Some state statutes explicitly give courts the discretion to allot the entire
property to one cotenant provided that this cotenant pay to the other
cotenant or cotenants a sum of money established by the court to make the
partition just.6 6 In one state, an owelty statute has been interpreted to permit
courts in that state to award the entire property to one of the cotenants,
provided that such a cotenant pay the other cotenant a court-determined
sum of money. Further, there are at least two states in which courts that
had no express statutory authority to make such an order have ordered
properties allotted to one cotenant provided that the cotenant afforded the
buyout remedy purchase the other cotenant's interest for an amount that
would make the partition fair.68
3. Alabama Affords Both Petitioning and Nonpetitioning
Parties the Opportunity to Buy Out Other Cotenants
Alabama has a statute that was enacted into law in 1979 that provides
that cotenants in a partition action that petition a court for partition by sale
may have their interests bought out by the nonpetitioning cotenants.69
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-500 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 241, § 14 (2004 & Supp. 2014).
66. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-500 (noting a court may grant some common owners
the opportunity to purchase the interests of other common owners who "have only a minimal interest");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 241, § 14; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 558.12 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 105.210 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-16 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-50 (2013); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5174 (2002 & Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-
4-3 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2014); Bissonnette v. Ventura, No. Civ.A. PC 02-3437, 2004 WL
2821652, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2004)
67. See Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 37, 39 (Me. 1981).
68. See Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 578 (D.N.J. 1986); Henry Talmadge & Co. v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 152 S.E. 243, 246 (Ga. 1930). In California, at least one court has ordered a
buyout under which the court gave two of the parties the initial chance to buy out the other party under
what the court indicated would be a private sale. See Odening v. Evans, No. B168869, 2006 WL
711071, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2006). In ordering this remedy it is unclear if the court relied
upon a particular statute or if it believed it had general equitable power to do so. Though there is a
California statute that gives a court discretion in a partition action to order a private sale as opposed to a
public auction, the statute does not define private sale to include giving one party the opportunity to buy
out another party without the consent of that other party. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 873.520 (West
1980).
69. ALA. CODE § 35-6-100 (1991 & Supp. 2014). This statutory section reads as follows:
Upon the filing of any petition for a sale for division of any property, real or personal, held
by joint owners or tenants in common, the court shall provide for the purchase of the
interests of the joint owners or tenants in common filing for the petition or any others named
therein who agree to the sale by the other joint owners or tenants in common or any one of
them. Provided that the joint owners or tenants in common interested in purchasing such
interests shall notify the court of same not later than 10 days prior to the date set for trial of
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Though the statute survived some earlier constitutional challenges, the
Alabama Supreme Court determined in Jolly v. Knopf that the statute
violated state and federal equal protection constitutional provisions to the
extent that it afforded the buyout remedy exclusively to defendants in
partition actions in which plaintiffs petition a court for partition by sale and
prevented plaintiffs in such actions from seeking to buy out the
defendants.70 As a result of the Jolly case, in cases in Alabama in which a
plaintiff petitions the court for partition by sale, the plaintiffs and
defendants may now invoke the buyout remedy.7 1 If both a plaintiff and a
defendant invoke the buyout remedy and fulfill the other relevant statutory
obligations, then the court will afford these cotenants the opportunity to
purchase the property through a private sales procedure in which the parties
are given the opportunity to acquire the property by bidding against one
another.72
The Jolly decision is very curious in some significant ways. It should
be noted that in Jolly, the Alabama Supreme Court first held that the
buyout statute was constitutional with respect to giving defendants, but not
plaintiffs, buyout rights.7 3 However, six months after issuing its first
opinion, after a rehearing ex mero motu for which the court offered no
reason for conducting, the Alabama Supreme Court withdrew its first
opinion.7 4 The court in the second Jolly opinion held that the buyout statute
violated Alabama and federal constitutional equal protection provisions by
providing defendants in partition actions with the opportunity to buy out
the interests of plaintiffs that petition for partition by sale but not
permitting plaintiffs petitioning for partition by sale with the opportunity to
buy out defendants.
the case and shall be allowed to purchase whether default has been entered against them or
not.
As the Alabama Supreme Court has noted, this statute is "not a model of draftsmanship" as it contains
technical inaccuracies and grammatical and other deficiencies which render its meaning somewhat
unclear. See Ragland v. Walker, 387 So. 2d 184, 185 (Ala. 1980).
70. See Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150, 153 (Ala. 1985).
71. See, e.g., Cupps v. Pruitt, 694 So. 2d 1346, 1353 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Few v. Few, 681 So.
2d 142, 144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
72. See, e.g., Cupps, 694 So. 2d at 1353; Few, 681 So. 2d at 144. The Alabama buyout statute
does indicate that only those interests of joint owners or tenants in common "who agree to the sale"
may be purchased. See ALA. CODE § 35-6-100 (1991 & Supp. 2014). However, courts in Alabama have
indicated that in cases in which both a cotenant that petitioned a court for partition by sale and a
nonpetitioning cotenant invoke the buyout right that the invocation of the buyout right, at least with
respect to the second party that invokes the right, constitutes consent to a private sale. See Cupps, 694
So. 2d at 1353.
73. Jolly v. Knopf, 454 So. 2d 919 (Ala. 1984), withdrawn by463 So. 2d 150 (Ala. 1985).
74. Jolly, 463 So. 2d at 151.
75. Id. at 153-54.
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The Jolly decision was poorly decided for at least two reasons. First, in
1999, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Alabama's constitution does
not contain any equal protection clause or equal protection provisions at
all.76 This decision completely undercuts the part of the Jolly court's
holding that indicated that the statute at issue in that case violated state
constitutional equal protection provisions.77
Second, under the rational basis review standard that the Jolly court
acknowledged was the proper standard of review in that case, it was quite a
stretch for the Jolly court to hold that in passing the statute at issue in Jolly,
the Alabama legislature took action that was not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest. In Jolly, the court indicated that the purpose of the
statute was "to afford protection to co-owners against other co-owners
seeking an involuntary sale of the co-owned land for pro-rata distribution
of the proceeds of sale."78 Normally, it would not be even a close call for a
court to hold that protecting the property rights of those that own property
in common with others against a forced sale of their property by their co-
owners represents a legitimate state interest. It also seems beyond question
that the statute at issue in Jolly was rationally related to that state interest.
Nevertheless, the court in Jolly did not address at all whether the
legislative purpose represented a legitimate state interest or whether the
statute was rationally related to that legislative purpose. Instead of any such
analysis, the court merely held in a very conclusory manner that the statute
violated state and federal equal protection constitutional provisions by
providing defendants an opportunity to buy out plaintiffs that petition a
court for partition by sale while not giving plaintiffs that petition a court for
partition by sale similar rights to buy out nonpetitioning defendants. Given
the significant problems with the court's legal analysis in Jolly, it is not
surprising that no courts from any other states with buyout statutes that
give nonpetitioning parties in partition actions greater buyout rights than
petitioning parties have determined that heir buyout statutes violate any
constitutional equal protection provisions, whether state or federal.
C. Irremediable Economic Harm Often Results From a Partition Sale
1. Forced Sale Prices Well Below Market Value
Despite the ostensible judicial concern for maximizing wealth in cases
in which courts use primarily economic rationales to justify the ordering of
a partition sale, or the apparent belief of many judges in other partition
76. See ExParte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172, 1186 (Ala. 1999).
77. See id.
78. Jolly, 463 So. 2d at 153.
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cases that properties sold under partition sales usually fetch a fair price,
many cotenants suffer serious economic harm as a result of partition sales.
These results should not be surprising given that partition sales simply
represent a type of forced sale and fair market value has been described as
"the very antithesis of forced-sale value."79 Under forced sales such as
partition sales, the sellers are compelled to sell, unlike those who sell
property under fair market value conditions, which means that these sellers
are not willing sellers.80
Second, like prospective buyers at other forced sales, prospective
buyers at partition sales often lack much information about the properties
subject to being sold.1 Many potential bidders are unable to find out
anything about a specific parcel of property that is scheduled to be sold
under a partition sale, even the basic fact of when the property is scheduled
to be sold, because most state statutes require that those who conduct
partition sales use the same procedures, or at least some of the key
procedures, that those who conduct other court-ordered, forced sales, such
as sales under execution, use.82 For example, in North Carolina, the
notification standards for sales under execution, which are very minimal,
also apply to partition sales. In addition to posting notice of the sale in an
area designated by the clerk of the superior court for such public notices,
which is often the courthouse, the standards mandate publication of notice
of the sale in a newspaper "once a week for at least two successive
weeks ... [provided that] [t]he period from the date of the first publication
to the date of the last publication, both dates inclusive, shall not be less
than seven days."83
This type of notice, however, "is calculated not to attract bidders but to
satisfy formal requirements."84 Descriptions that fail to give the reader
sufficient information to know whether he is interested in the property,
including newspaper notices in which properties are only described using a
79. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994).
80. See Mitchell, Malpezzi & Green, supra note 5, at 602.
81. Id. at 602-03.
82. Id. at 603. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-6-62 (1991) ("[T]he sale shall be conducted, the
purchase money collected, conveyance of the title made and all proceedings subsequent o the sale
conducted in every respect as is done when property in the hands of an executor or administrator is to
be distributed."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-28 (2013) (stating that with limited exceptions, procedures to
be used for a partition sale are the same as are provided in Article 29A of Chapter I of the General
Statutes, which govern execution sales); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 842.18 (West 2007) (stating that notice of
partition sales to be given using the same requirements as for sales on execution).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.17.
84. Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 311, 317 (1982).
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legal description, are therefore still legally sufficient.8s As a result of these
types of notice procedures, many potential bidders do not participate in
partition sales because they never find out about such sales in the first
place. Others who do participate usually end up making below market
value bids in part because they often have little quality information about
properties subject to a partition sale.86
At least two other features of the forced sale procedures that are used
for most partition sales make it very unlikely that a partition sale will yield
a fair market value price. First, the fact that a property subject to a partition
sale is exposed to the market for a period of time that falls far short of the
typical period of time properties on the open market are exposed to the
market substantially increases the chances that the property will end up
being sold for less than its market value. Second, prospective buyers at
most partition sales are not able to finance the purchase of the properties in
the way that those who purchase property under fair market value
conditions typically can finance real estate acquisitions. To this end, in
most states, the high bidder at a partition sale only can acquire the property
by making an immediate cash payment to the person charged with
managing the sale. Such a requirement is obviously quite different from
how prospective buyers seeking to purchase property on the open market
can make bids, which often are contingent upon their securing financing
within thirty to sixty days.8 9 Given this cash payment requirement,
significantly fewer prospective buyers seek to purchase property at a
typical partition sale as compared to the number of people who seek to
purchase property that is offered for sale on the open market.
In sum, as is well known, forced sales such as foreclosure sales and
sales upon execution of real and personal property often yield prices well
below fair market value because the procedures used in these sales are not
designed to yield market value prices.90 In many instances, these sale
procedures yield fire sale prices.91 These same forced sale procedures are
used by most states for partition sales. As a result, many, if not most,
partition sales are- in fact wealth-depleting, notwithstanding the wealth-
maximizing rationale many courts have used to order partition sales in the
first instance.
85. Mitchell, Malpezzi & Green, supra note 5, at 604-05 (highlighting an Alaska case in which
more than 500 acres of property were sold on execution after the property was advertised a few times in
the Anchorage Daily Times in an advertisement that included just the legal description for the property).
86. See id. at 602-03.
87. Id. at 604.
88. Id. at 606.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 602.
91. Id. at 612.
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Very few states have addressed the lack of fit between the wealth-
maximizing justifications for ordering partition sales and the actual forced
sale procedures used for partition sales. Under the law in most states,
tenants in common who are not in a financial position to make a
competitive auction bid have almost no ability to prevent their property
from being sold at a partition sale for a forced sale or a fire sale price. To
this end, only a small minority of states mandate by statute that property
sold at a partition sale yield any minimum sales price.
In many states, property ordered sold under a partition sale may be sold
only at a public auction.92 In a very small number of these states, the
property must sell for some minimum price. All these states require that the
cotenants receive at least two-thirds of the property's appraised price.93 In
contrast, the statutory minimum sales price requirement in a very small
number of states only applies to private sales, a sales procedure very few
states permit to be used for partition sales.94 In these states, which all also
permit property ordered sold under a partition sale to be sold at a public
auction, the property must sell for at least its court-appraised value if it was
offered for sale at a private sale. In New Mexico, however, the minimum
sales price applies to almost every partition sale, whether by private sale or
public auction, though the minimum sales price differs depending upon the
type of sale.95 If a New Mexico court orders a public sale, a property in
almost all instances must sell for at least two-thirds of its appraised value,
but a property cannot sell for less than its fully appraised value if a New
92. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5307.11 (West 1995 & Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-32-
111 (2013).
93. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-105 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1003 (2005 & Supp. 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.12; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1513 (West
2010 & Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-32-111 & 112.
94. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 558.17 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-16 (2011); PA.
R. Civ. P. 1567. Such private sales are authorized in almost every instance by statute. However, at least
in Connecticut and Wisconsin, such sales have been authorized in partition actions by courts though
there was no express statutory authority to order such private sales. See Giulietti v. Giulietti, 784 A.2d
905, 936 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Heyse v. Heyse, 176 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Wis. 1970). In the context of
partition actions, the term private sale can mean something different in different cases or in different
jurisdictions. In some instances, it can mean a buyout by one of the parties on terms determined by a
court. See Odening v. Evans, No. B168869, 2006 WL 711071, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2006). In
other instances, it may mean a sale in which bidding is confined to the parties in the partition action.
See, e.g., 42 PA. R. CIV. P. 1566 ("If any party rejects the proposed allotment of the purparts or if no
objection is made to a sale under Rule 1563, the property shall be offered for private sale by open
bidding confined to the parties to be held upon not less than twenty days' notice."). In other cases, it
may mean a sale to a specific prospective buyer on terms established by a court, including to a buyer
who is not a cotenant or even a party in the partition action. See Buell v. Rubin, No. 310497, 2005 WL
2995494, at *1-2 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov. 9, 2005). Further, it can mean that he property will be listed for
sale by the parties, a broker, or someone else so that the property may be offered for sale on the open
market. See Heyse, 176 N.W.2d at 321.
95. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-7 (LexisNexis 1978).
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Mexico court orders a private sale.96 Finally, in Texas, real property sold
under a partition sale is required to be sold for its fair market value
irrespective of how the property is sold.97
2. Courts Rarely Set Aside Partition Sales Based Upon Low Price
Alone
In the overwhelming number of states that have no statutory
requirement that partition sales yield some minimum price, a cotenant
rarely will be able to convince a court to set aside a partition sale solely
based upon a claim that the sales price was inadequate.98 This is the case no
matter how grossly inadequate the sales price may have been,99 including in
cases in which a partition sale yields a price that is $100,000 or more below
the property's market value or otherwise a price that represents just a
fraction of the property's market value. For example, an appellate court in
Kentucky confirmed a judicial sale of jointly-owned property despite the
fact that the property sold for less than 5 percent of its value based upon
uncontested evidence of its value.o00
Nevertheless, courts throughout the country will consider setting aside
a partition sale if, in addition to the inadequacy of the sales price, there are
other circumstances that existed, such as mistake, fraud, other misconduct,
or irregularity by the purchaser or some other person connected with the
partition sale that may have caused the inadequate sales price.'0 In these
circumstances, the greater the discrepancy between the sales price and the
market value of the property, the slighter the need for some other
circumstance to have existed that negatively impacted the sales price.102
However, there is no widespread agreement among courts from different
jurisdictions on the conditions that must be present for a court to set aside a
partition sale when there is a claim that the sales price was severely
inadequate but there is no direct evidence that any other circumstance
negatively impacted the sales price. Courts in some jurisdictions may set
96. Id. In New Mexico, however, the minimum sales price requirement does not apply to
properties valued at less than $10,000 if the property is sold at a public auction. Id.
97. Grimm v. Beck, 237 S.W.2d 1017, 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
98. See, e.g., Sulkowski v. Sulkowski, 561 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Necaise v.
Ladner, 910 So. 2d 699, 702 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
99. See Sulkowski, 561 So. 2d at 418.
100. See Gross v. Gross, 350 S.W.2d 470, 471-72 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); cf Suchan v. Suchan, 741
P.2d 1289, 1297 (Idaho 1986) (confirming an execution sale in which property with a market value of
$300,090 sold for an effective purchase price of $71,000, which represented 24 percent of the
property's market value).
101. Necaise, 910 So. 2d at 702; 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 143 (2003); 12 FLA. JUR. 2D
Cotenancy and Partition § 125 (2014).
102. See, e.g., Apex Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 7 S.W.3d 820, 829 (Tex. App. 1999).
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aside a partition sale if the disparity between the sales price and the market
value of the property is so great as to shock the conscience of the court,
thereby creating a presumption of fraud.10 3 In jurisdictions applying this
rule, the sales price that may shock a court is not susceptible to any
mathematical formula but instead may depend upon a number of different
factors, including the value of the property, the harm that may result from
confirming the sale, etc.104
Courts in a very small number of jurisdictions will consider setting
aside a partition sale based upon a claim that the sales price is inadequate if
confirming the sale would result in substantial injustice even if there is no
fraud (actual or presumed) or other direct or indirect evidence of unfair
circumstances that impacted the judicial sale.105 However, courts in these
jurisdictions only will set aside a partition sale in cases in which there is no
evidence of unfair circumstances if the sales price is deemed to be grossly
inadequate, which is a much higher standard than courts use in considering
whether to set aside a partition sale when some unfair circumstance exists
that contributes to the sales price being inadequate to some extent.10 6
Nevertheless, very few of these courts will set aside a partition sale if the
sales price is at least 20 percent of the property's market value.0 7
3. Attorney's Fees Awarded to Party Who Petitioned Court for Sale
Not only do nearly all partition sales yield sales prices that often are
well below the fair market value of the properties sold, but also an
overwhelming majority of states permit courts to make an attorney's fee
103. See, e.g., Sangamon Assocs., Ltd. v. Carpenter 1985 Family P'ship, Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 141,
144 (Mo. 2005).
104. Looper v. Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 729 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Ark. 1987).
105. See, e.g., Walsch v. Deanovich, 168 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Wis. 1969).
106. See Armstrong v. Csurilla, 817 P.2d 1221, 1234 (N.M. 1991). But see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 873.730(c)(2-3) (West 1980) (In California, a partition sale may be vacated if "[t]he sale[s]
price is disproportionate to the value of the property" or if "[i]t appears that a new sale will yield a sum
that exceeds the sale price by at least 10 percent on the first ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and 5
percent on the amount in excess thereof, determined after a reasonable allowance for the expenses of a
new sale."); Vamell v. Lee, 14 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1944) (stating that in Iowa, a court considering
whether to confirm a partition sale considers whether the sales price was the highest price that
reasonably could be obtained and not just whether the sales price was grossly inadequate).
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 cmt. b (1997) ("'Gross inadequacy'
cannot be precisely defined in terms of a specific percentage of fair market value. Generally, however, a
court is warranted in invalidating a sale where the price is less than 20 percent of fair market value and,
absent other foreclosure defects, is usually not warranted in invalidating a sale that yields in excess of
that amount."). Cf Koay v. Koay, 359 S.E.2d 113, 116 (W. Va. 1987) ("A partition sale is a forced sale,
and for that reason courts have been hesitant to find that a bid substantially below an appraised value or
an arm's length transaction value is so grossly inadequate to shock the conscience. Bids often
amounting to only 50% or less of the appraised or arm's length value have been upheld.").
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award in a partition action." Attorney's fee awards in these cases most
often are awarded under the "common benefit" doctrine, which is an
exception to the American rule on attorney's fees under which each party
normally is responsible for paying his own attorney's fees.09 Under this
doctrine, parties may have to pay a portion of another party's attorney's
fees if the attorney for the other party provided legal services in the
litigation that the court deems inured to the benefit of those to be charged
as well as to the party who employed the attorney.110 Of the states that
permit attorney's fees to be awarded in a partition action, a majority
permits an attorney's fee award to be made to any party; however, some
states that permit attorney's fees to be awarded in partition actions only
permit (or even require) an attorney's fee award to be made to the plaintiff
or the plaintiff s attorney. 1
Although courts in the states that allow attorney's fees primarily
consider whether to award attorney's fees under the common benefit
doctrine, there is considerable disagreement among the states as to what
legal services may be deemed to have been done for the common benefit.112
108. See ALA. CODE § 34-3-60 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.620 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 18-60-419 (2003 & Supp. 2013); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § § 874.010 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-28-109 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 64.081 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 668-17 (LexisNexis 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-545 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/17-125 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1003 (2005 & Supp. 2013); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4613 (1998) (allowing attorney fees only in uncontested partition actions);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6508 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 241, § 22 (2004 & Supp.
2014); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-21-31 (2004 & Supp. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-29-218 (2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,108 (1995 & Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39.480 (West, Westlaw
through 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-8 (LexisNexis 1978 & Supp. 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
16-45 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.25 (West 1995 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1515 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.405 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-110
(2005 & Supp. 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-45-24 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-27-121 (2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1243 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-92 (2007); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.52.480 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 842.21 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
32-122 (2013); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.1225; MO. SUP. CT. R. 96.30; PA. R. CIv. P. 1574; O'Connor v.
Bielski, 701 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ga. 2010) (indicating that a court may award attorney's fees in certain
partition actions); Faulkner v. Terrell, 287 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (allowing narrow
exceptions for attorney's fees in partition actions); Haynes v. Cameron, 295 N.W. 372, 373 (Mich.
1940); Kuller v. Kuller, 109 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Minn. 1961); McMullin v. Doughty, 55 A. 115, 117
(N.J. Ch. 1903) (outlining a very narrow allowance for attorney's fees in particularly complicated
partition cases); Keener v. Korn, 264 S.E.2d 829, 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Francis v. Francis, 102
A.2d 872, 873 (R.I. 1954); Woods v. McLain, 166 S.E. 279, 280 (W. Va. 1932) (allowing attorney's
fees in partition actions when one party is unrepresented).
109. Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489-90 (R.I. 2007); D.E. Evins, Annotation, Allowance
and Apportionment of Counsel Fees in Partition Action or Suit, 94 A.L.R.2D 575, § 7 (1964).
110. See Moore, 914 A.2d at 490; Evins, supra note 109.
111. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-419 (allowing a reasonable fee to the attorney bringing
the suit); MIss. CODE. ANN. § 11-21-31 ("In all cases of the partition or sale of property for division of
proceeds, the court may allow a reasonable attorney's fee to the attorney or the plaintiff. . . ."); Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 96.30 (indicating that "[t]he court shall allow a reasonable fee to the attorney instituting the
action in partition").
112. Evins, supra note 109.
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In some states that permit courts to award attorney's fees in partition
actions, courts cannot award fees if the partition action is an adversarial
proceeding, including in cases in which one of the parties contests another
party's petition for a partition sale.'13 However, in other jurisdictions,
courts may award attorney's fees even in adversarial partition actions in
which one or more parties contested another party's request for the court to
order partition by sale.'14 In these cases, a party who hires an attorney in an
effort to resist a court-ordered sale runs the risk of having to pay his or her
own attorney as well as a portion of the fees of the attorney for the party
who petitioned the court to order the property sold, if the court does in fact
end up ordering the property sold.15
Irrespective of what the formal law may be, advocates for tenancy-in-
common owners who have contested requests for partition sale have long
claimed that courts primarily make attorney's fee awards, and often
substantial such awards, to the cotenants that have successfully petitioned
courts to order partition sales. These advocates believe that attorney's fee
awards in such instances are unjust because the actions almost never
provide any benefits to their clients but often harm their clients in
important ways. Many of the cotenants these attorneys represent not only
end up losing their property at a judicial sale that often yields a fire sale
price, but also, they are then required to pay part of the legal fees of the
cotenants who successfully sought the forced sale.'16
In some cases, an attorney's fee award can be relatively small, but in
others, it can be very substantial. As a technical matter, sometimes courts
award attorney's fees in partition actions by using the so-called lodestar
approach, which is the reasonable amount of time the attorney spent
working on parts of a case that qualify for an award of attorney's fees
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.17 In many other cases, however,
courts award attorney's fees in partition cases in which the property is
ordered sold based upon a fixed percentage of the sales price. In terms of
113. See, e.g., Reagan v. Rivers, 345 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Ark. 1961) ("In adversary suits there is no
ground for taxing the fees of the solicitor of one of the parties against the other parties . . . ." (quoting
Lewis v. Crawford, 1 S.W.2d 26, 26 (Ark. 1928) (internal quotations omitted))); Le Blanc v. Le Blanc,
80 So. 2d 715, 720 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (requiring the parties bringing forth the "contentions" to pay
their own fees).
114. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 7. In one case highlighted by the Associated Press, the
attorney for a small number of cotenants who were deemed to have petitioned the court in 1996 for the
sale of 300 acres of property that had been owned by the Sanders family, an African-American family,
for eighty-three years was awarded approximately 20 percent of the $505,000 sales price. The court
made this award despite the fact that the majority of the named plaintiffs had indicated that they had not
authorized the attorney to file the partition action and despite the fact that several of the cotenants hired
another attorney in an effort to contest the request for a partition by sale. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Howe v. Tarvezian, 894 N.E.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
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the latter approach, courts often order that attorney's fees be paid in an
amount representing 5 percent,118 10 percent,"l9 or 15 percent of the
property's sales price.12 0 There even have been many cases in which courts
have ordered attorney's fees that constituted 20 percentl21 or even 25
percent of the property's sale price.122
In general, permitting attorney's fees to be awarded in a contested
partition action often represents a highly questionable application of the
common benefit doctrine. In many cases, the benefit that is purportedly
conferred on a party held responsible for paying a portion of his
adversary's attorney's fees in a partition action may not be considered by
such a party (or by almost any reasonable person) to represent any benefit
to him or her at all. In other instances, it may be a benefit that at best may
be framed as being roughly equal to some harm the cotenant suffered as a
result of the legal work done by opposing counsel in the partition action.123
It is particularly inappropriate that courts have made attorney's fee awards
under the common benefit doctrine, as many courts have done, in partition
actions on behalf of the party that petitioned the court for a partition sale
when the partition sale caused cotenants who contested the request for a
partition sale economic harm, often severe economic harm. In such cases,
there simply is no sound basis for a court to award any attorney's fees
under the common benefit doctrine.
4. Fees Paid to Commissioners, Surveyors, and Others
In partition actions, courts commonly appoint one or more people
known as commissioners or referees, depending upon the jurisdiction.12 4
118. Brooks v. Kunz, 637 S.W.2d 135, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
119. Anderson v. Lee, 621 So. 2d 1305, 1306-07 (Ala. 1993).
120. Benton v. King, 934 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
121. Lewan & Barclay, supra note 7.
122. E-mail from Carolyn Gaines-Varner, Reg'1 Dir., Legal Services Alabama, to Thomas W.
Mitchell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. (Sept. 12, 2013, 09:49 CDT) (on file with author).
123. Moore v. Davis, No. 4377-VCG, 2011 WL 3890534, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2011). In
Moore, the court stated the following:
Although subjectively the Respondents have an asset of less value after the sale than before,
objectively what they have received is equivalent: they exchanged a one-sixth undivided
ownership in the property for one-sixth of the net value of the property upon sale. Since,
however, the Respondents have been deprived of one asset (an asset which, in fact, they
preferred) in exchange for an asset of equal value, there has been no benefit to the class. The
exchange is a wash. It would be inequitable for this Court not only to force this exchange
(which it is each co-tenant's right to accomplish under the statute), but to also force the
Respondents to pay for this privilege. Because I find that no common benefit has been
accomplished for the co-tenants, application of the "common benefit" exception is not
warranted, and each party must bear his own attorneys' fees.
124. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 119 (2014). Most states refer to these people as commissioners.
See, e.g., Yturria v. Kimbro, 921 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App. 1996). However, in some other states
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Many assume that those eligible to be commissioners or referees possess
some expertise or localized knowledge about real property matters that can
be helpful to a court in a partition matter.125 State laws providing for the
appointment of commissioners or referees, however, do not establish
detailed requirements setting forth the knowledge, let alone the expert
knowledge, a commissioner or referee must possess.126
Court-appointed commissioners can assist a court in any number of
ways in a partition action, including by helping the court decide whether
the property should be divided in kind or sold,12 7 by proposing how the
property should be divided in kind,12 8 or by conducting a court-ordered sale
of the property.12 9 Many jurisdictions even require courts to appoint
commissioners or referees in partition actions in at least some phase of the
action.130 Even though commissioners or referees often play a prominent
role in partition actions, legal scholarship on partition law has almost
completely overlooked any issue bearing upon the role that commissioners
or referees play. For example, there is no legal scholarship that addresses
the criteria courts use to appoint commissioners or referees, the influence
these court-appointed commissioners or referees can have on the outcome
of a partition action, the extent to which commissioners or referees in some
jurisdictions may have conflicts of interest, and the compensation these
commissioners or referees receive for their work.
In terms of compensation, commissioners or referees in partition
actions are entitled to reasonable fees.13' Although in a minority of
jurisdictions statutes establish the fee a commissioner or referee may
including California, these people are referred to as referees. See Richmond v. Dofflemyer, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In Georgia, they are referred to as partitioners. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-6-163 (2010).
125. See, e.g., J. H. Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1113-
15 (1941) (noting that referees and commissioners, for example, appointed by courts pursuant to
specialized statutes that only apply to certain well-defined and discrete types of cases including
partition actions are usually presumed to be experts with respect to the issues they are charged either to
evaluate or to prepare some type of report for review by the court).
126. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-512 (2010); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 96.12 (recognizing that
commissioners who are appointed in Missouri need only be "residents of any county in which any of
the land to be divided lies").
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 241, § 12 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1509 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014); see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 2624 (2009).
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-6-45 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 724 (2009 & Supp.
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.06 (West 1995 & Supp. 2014).
129. See, e.g., MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 241, § 31. In some jurisdictions, if the court orders a
mixed remedy-partition in kind of part of the property and a sale of the remainder-a court can
appoint a referee to conduct the partition in kind of part of the property and a different referee to
conduct the sale of the remainder. See, e.g., CAL. CIV PROC. CODE § 873.020 (West 1980).
130. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 119.
131. 68 C.J.S. Partition § 141 (2014).
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receive in a partition action,13 2 in most jurisdictions, a court has the
discretion to determine the amount of the fee. 133 In some jurisdictions, the
commissioner's or referee's fees must reflect the number of days the
commissioner or referee worked on the case, and in other jurisdictions,
courts have more open-ended authority to set the amount of the fees.134 In
some cases in which courts have ordered a partition sale, courts have
awarded fees for commissioners or referees in an amount representing a
fixed percentage, for example 5 percent, of the purchase price.13 In
addition to providing commissioners or referees with a reasonable fee,
courts also commonly award fees to surveyors, appraisers, auctioneers, and
other people who can assist a court in a partition action,136 and sometimes
the referees or commissioners have the discretion to enter into contracts
with these types of professionals.13 1
When one takes account of the forced sale price partition sales
typically yield and the various fees a court may award that come out of the
purchase price, including attorney's fees, commissioner's fees, and
surveyor's fees, for example, it becomes apparent that many if not most
partition sales do not maximize wealth for the cotenants. In far too many
cases, the cotenants in fact end up stripped of a substantial amount of the
real estate wealth associated with their tenancy-in-common ownership.
II. Low- TO MODERATE-INCOME TENANCY-IN-COMMON OWNERS FACE
PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WITH PARTITION ACTIONS
A. Features That Make Tenancy-in-Common Ownership Among Low- to
Moderate-Income Property Owners Particularly Unstable and Risky
Though people of many different backgrounds who own tenancy-in-
common property under the default rules experience a range of problems
with their ownership, a subset of tenancy-in-common property owners are
particularly at risk of losing their property at forced partition sales, together
with a significant amount of their wealth. These people tend to own
132. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 8003(a)-(b) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 2014).
133. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-7-35 (2010); Meister v. Rakow, 284 P.2d 464 (Ariz. 1955).
134. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 528.220 (West 1953 & Supp. 2014) (providing that
compensation be calculated based on number of days of employment), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 873.010(b)(3) (West 1980) (providing only that the court may "[fjix the reasonable compensation for
the services of the referee and provide for payment of the referee's reasonable expenses.").
135. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Stalnaker, 96 S.E.2d 907, 909 (W. Va. 1957).
136. Lawrence v. Donovan, 673 P.2d 130, 132, 134 (Mont. 1983); see also 68 C.J.S. Partition
§ 224 (2014).
137. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 873.110 (West 1980).
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undivided interests in tenancy-in-common property, under the default rules,
in which many of the cotenants are low- to moderate-income individuals.
Often in these situations, the tenancy in common arose in the first instance
because an ancestor who was not wealthy or who was not legally
sophisticated (or both) transferred his or her real property by intestacy to
two or more heirs.
In many families in which intestate succession first created the tenancy
in common, individual cotenants who acquired their interests by intestacy
subsequently transfer their individual interests by intestate succession as
well. Oftentimes, this results in an increasing number of people owning an
undivided interest in the property. This pattern of property transfer has
been so prevalent within certain communities that many people within
these communities refer to family-owned, tenancy-in-common property as
"heirs' property" or "heirs property" or "heir property."1 38
This pattern of property transfer also results in property ownership
becoming increasingly unstable over time because any one of the growing
number of cotenants may file a partition action and request the court to
order partition by sale. What makes these property owners even more at
risk of losing their property is that the properties, which were often not
considered prime real estate when first acquired by an ancestor of some or
all of the current cotenants, are often now in the path of development.
Further, heirs property ownership often presents other serious problems for
both those who own such property and for others. For example, one
commentator claims that heirs property ownership in Calhoun County,
Alabama, impedes the ability of heirs property owners in that county from
obtaining financing to improve their property, thereby impeding their
ability to build wealth. According to this commentator, this phenomenon in
turn harms the public because substantial tax revenues are foregone while
many of the parcels of heirs property remain severely underdeveloped.139
138. The term is so common that some nonprofit organizations that work with low-income
property owners have the term in their organizational title or, otherwise, have developed projects of one
type or another which are referred to as "heir property" or "heirs' property" projects. For example, the
Center for Heirs' Property Preservation in Charleston, South Carolina exclusively works with low-
income heirs property owners. See THE CENTER FOR HEIRS' PROPERTY PRESERVATION,
http://www.heirsproperty.org (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). Appleseed, a leading public interest
organization with a network of centers in several southern states has an "Heir Property" project as does
its affiliated centers in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. See Heir Property,
APPLESEED, http://www.appleseednetwork.org/what-we-do/projects/heir-property/ (last visited Aug. 3,
2013). The Heirs' Property Retention Coalition is an umbrella organization of attorneys, advocates, and
academics who are "heavily involved in litigation, legislative reform, and/or scholarly study related to
heirs' property" that was initially formed in 2006 to participate in the drafting process for the Uniform
Partition of Heirs Property Act but which is now working on others heirs property initiatives. See About
HPRC, HEIRS' PROPERTY RETENTION COALITION, http://www.southemcoalition.org/hprc/?q=node/6
(last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
139. See, e.g., Craig H. Baab, Heir Property: A Constraint for Planners, An Opportunity for
Communities: The Legacy of Steve Larkin, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Nov. 2011, at 3, 10 ("[In Calhoun
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A significant percentage of families who own heirs property poorly
understand many of the legal rules governing tenancy-in-common
ownership, which is not surprising given that many of the rules are
counterintuitive and given that these families often lack access to basic
legal services.140 Many believe that their ownership is secure as long as
they pay their property taxes and stay current on their mortgage obligations
to the extent that they have any mortgage obligations at all. Further, one
study of such property owners revealed that he overwhelming majority of
these owners believed that their property was safe from a sale unless all of
the cotenants would agree to sell.141 Therefore, many of these families
wrongly assume that he large number of family members who own an
undivided interest in the property serves as protection from the property
being sold. Tragically, the first time many of these families learn about the
actual rules governing tenancy-in-common ownership is after one of the
cotenants threatens to file a partition action or, in many instances, after
such a cotenant has filed a partition action. Further, families often
experience difficulty even finding out that a partition action has been filed
as a result of antiquated, state notice requirements,14 2 which obviously
compromises their ability to take any meaningful legal action to protect
their property in a timely way.
These families are also particularly at risk of losing much of their real
estate wealth as a result of a court-ordered partition sale. With respect to
partition sales, the group of people who bid on the property at the public
auctions is often quite small and often consists of just one or more of the
cotenants themselves. Many heirs property owners are not well positioned
to make effective bids at partition sales for the following reasons. First,
banks and other financial institutions almost always refuse to accept
fractional interests in tenancy-in-common property as collateral for
loans.14 3 Second, many heirs property owners are "land rich but cash poor,"
in that they do not have other substantial liquid assets (or tangible assets for
County, Alabama, 771 parcels of heirs property with an aggregate tax-appraised value of approximately
$31 million] is not working for the community, much less the owners .... While that land is generating
tax revenue for the county, it is not generating nearly what it could if the owners could access the land's
equity to improve it.").
140. Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 521.
141. EMERGENCY LAND FUND, THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL LAND
TENURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 123 (1984) [hereinafter THE IMPACT
OF HEIR PROPERTY].
142. See Baab, supra note 139, at 9.
143. See Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 561 n.346.
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that matter) that they can use, including to secure a loan, to enable them to
bid effectively at a partition sale.'"
Because so many heirs property owners lack the financial ability to
make competitive bids at partition sales, the winning bidders at these
sales-bidders who sometimes are people who recently had acquired a
small interest in the property-are often able to acquire the property for a
price well below even the property's forced sale value. As a result, forced
partition sales have been particularly devastating economically for poorer
tenancy-in-common owners because these owners typically have much less
diversified asset portfolios than wealthier people and their real estate
holdings tend to constitute a substantial percentage of their overall asset
holdings.14 5 The loss of real estate wealth that minorities have experienced
as a result of partition sales is consistent with a disturbing broader trend in
which the wealth gap between whites and many minorities-a gap which
had been substantial before the onset of the Great Recession-has
increased substantially in recent years.14 6
B. Problems Specific Property Owners Have Faced with Partition Actions
1. African-Americans
The problem that African-Americans have experienced with partition
actions has received far more academic and media attention than the
problem any other group or community has experienced with partition
actions.147 African-Americans have been particularly at risk of losing their
144. Cf Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 How. L.J. 849,
860 (2013) [hereinafter Mitchell, Inequality] (noting that African-American and Hispanic households
have asset portfolios that are much less diversified than the asset portfolios for white households).
145. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS
BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS 17-21 (2011), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-1 IFINAL.pdf [hereinafter
TWENTY-TO-ONE].
146. See Mitchell, Inequality, supra note 144, at 858 (noting that as of 2009 the ratio of white
wealth to black wealth stood at twenty-to-one representing a near doubling of the white wealth-black
wealth ratio as compared to the ratio from 2005 and that the ratio of white wealth to Hispanic wealth
stood at eighteen-to-one, a ratio that was more than two and a half times as large as the 2005 white
wealth-Hispanic wealth ratio). This wealth gap has grown in large part in recent years due to the far
greater toll the downtum in the real estate market and the foreclosure crisis have had upon minorities
than these phenomena have had upon white Americans. See TWENTY-TO-ONE, supra note 145, at 24.
147. See Letter from David J. Dietrich, Co-Chair, Prop. Pres. Task Force of the Real Prop.
Probate and Trust Law Section of the A.B.A., to Shannon Skinner, Co-Chair, Joint Editorial Bd. for
Unif. Real Prop. Acts 1 (June 16, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter June 16, 2005 Letter from
Dietrich to Skinner]. See also, e.g., Craig-Taylor, supra note 45; Rivers, supra note 40; Casagrande,
supra note 40; Tom Barton, Hilton Head's Purchase ofHeirs Land Fuels Emotions; Councilman Cites
"Mistake" in Proposing Sale, THE BEAUFORT GAZETTE, (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.islandpacket.com/2011/04/13/1619570/hilton-heads-purchase-of-heirs.html; Anna Stolley
Persky, In the Cross-Heirs, A.B.A. J. (May 2, 2009, 4:40 AM),
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property as a result of partition sales because a substantial percentage of
African-Americans who own land in the South own such properties under
the default, tenancy-in-common rules, instead of under, for example, what
is referred to as a tenancy-in-common agreement or TIC agreement.14 8 In
fact, studies have documented that African-Americans have lost a
significant amount of real property as a result of partition sales.149 The
Associated Press's award-winning 2001 series on black land loss entitled
Torn from the Land, which featured a segment on partition actions, served
as the catalyst for the formation in 2003 of the Property Preservation Task
Force (PPTF), a task force of the American Bar Association's Section of
Real Property, Trust and Estate Law, which was dissolved in 2011.150
2. Families Who Own Land in Appalachia
In low-income areas of Appalachia, there is evidence that there is a
significant amount of tenancy-in-common ownership. For example, one
researcher who evaluated the prevalence of tenancy-in-common ownership
in certain areas in Letcher County, Kentucky, discovered that tenancy-in-
common ownership was not uncommon as it pertained to the properties he
examined.'5 1 Within low-income communities in Appalachia, a group of
researchers discovered that some of those who own tenancy-in-common
property in Appalachia have expressed concern about displacement as a
result of court-ordered partition sales.15 2 For example, these researchers
uncovered one case in which certain members of one family filed a
partition action in which they requested the court to order a partition in
kind. However, after the court-appointed commissioners determined that
the property was not divisible, the court considered whether to order a
partition sale even though there is no evidence that any of the cotenants had
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/inthecross-heirs/; Bruce Smith, Heirs Defy History of
Blacks Losing Land, USA TODAY, (Oct. 15, 2006, 9:07 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-15-slave-descendantsx.htm.
148. See Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 518. A 1984 study estimated that 41 percent
of black-owned land in the southeastern states is owned under the tenancy-in-common default rules.
THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 141, at 64, 475.
149. Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 511.
150. E-mail from Robin K. Roy, Section Dir., A.B.A. Section of Real Prop., Trust and Estate
Law, to Thomas W. Mitchell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. (Sept. 4, 2012, 09:52 CST) (on
file with author). The PPTF played the key role in advocating that NCCUSL establish a drafting
committee to develop a uniform act to reform partition law as that law applies to tenancy-in-common
ownership.
151. See B. James Deaton, Intestate Succession and Heir Property. Implications for Future
Research on the Persistence ofPoverty in Central Appalachia, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 927, 930-32 (2007).
152. See B. James Deaton et al., Examining the Consequences and Character of "Heir Property,
68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2344, 2345 (2009).
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requested such a partition sale.153 This family's experience is consistent
with the experience of African-American families and other families who
have had property ordered sold in partition actions despite the fact that in
these cases no one in the common ownership group petitioned the court for
a court-ordered sale.
3. Middle-Class White Families
A surprising number of families who are not poor or minority have
faced problems with tenancy-in-common ownership. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, it came to light that there were many middle-class and
wealthy white heirs property owners in New Orleans (in addition to many
African-American heirs property owners from different economic classes
as well).15 4 In addition, there is evidence that in Maine, many middle-class
white families own tenancy-in-common property under the default rules.
According to Hugh Macgill, the former dean of the University of
Connecticut School of Law, whose wife's family owns 350 acres of
tenancy-in-common property in rural Maine under the default rules, this
type of ownership is commonly known as "heir-locked" property in parts of
rural Maine.155 Macgill characterizes tenancy-in-common ownership under
the default rules as "probably the most unstable and vulnerable form of
ownership known to the common law." 56 With respect to the farm that his
wife's family owns, he states that the vast majority of the cotenants want to
address in a proactive way their concern that a developer might be tempted
to seek a way to force a sale of the property, which would undercut their
desire to preserve their ancestral property.157
153. See id. at 2349. In another case, family members who were not able to come to an agreement
on partitioning their tenancy-in-common property in kind worried that if a partition action was filed a
court might decide to order the property sold even though no cotenant would request such a sale. Id. at
2350.
154. See, e.g., Ariella Cohen, Hurdles to Heirship: Heirship Property Prevents Many New
Orleans Residents from Receiving Grants, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, (Aug. 4, 2008),
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/I P2-16962570.html.
155. E-mail from Hugh C. Macgill, Professor of Law, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law, to William R.
Breetz, President and Exec. Dir. of the Conn. Legal Initiative, Inc., Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (July 7,





4. Hispanic Communities Who Were Intended Beneficiaries of
Community Land Grants Made by Spain and Mexico in New
Mexico
When New Mexico was under Spanish and then Mexican control from
the end of the seventeenth century until he mid-nineteenth century, Spain,
and then Mexico, made land grants to individuals, groups, and towns.15 s
Spain also issued land grants to several groups of indigenous Pueblo people
who had long occupied territory in what became New Mexico.159 In
addition to issuing individual land grants under which the land granted
became the private property of the individual grantee, Spain and Mexico
both recognized a distinct type of land ownership called a community land
grant, which was very different from an individual land grant.160 To this
end, the community land grant was considered a quasi-public, corporate
entity that was to hold the common land in perpetuity, much like a city
owns a park for the benefit of its residents, none of whom has any claim to
private ownership of the park, including any right to sell the community
land.'6 '
The Mexican-American War, which lasted from 1846 to 1848,
concluded upon the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on
February 2, 1848.162 The treaty provided property right protections to those
who had been granted land by Spain or Mexico in the territories that
Mexico relinquished to the United States, though the scope of the land
grant protections that the treaty provided remains contested.163 Ultimately,
Congress established the Court of Private Land Claims (CPLC) in 1891 to
resolve the large backlog of land claims individuals or communities had
made with respect to contested land in the states of Colorado, Nevada, and
Wyoming, and in the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, in an
effort to get Congress to affirm their rights to particular properties-rights
they claim Spain or Mexico had granted to them.16 4 Congress instructed
"the CPLC to approve land grants 'lawfully and regularly derived' under
158. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-59, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO:
FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN
NEW MEXICO 3 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157550.pdf.
159. Id.
160. See David Benavides & Ryan Golten, Righting the Record: A Response to the GAO's 2004
Report Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible Options Regarding Longstanding
Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 857, 871-72 (2008).
161. See id. at 872.
162. See Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 202 n.7, 208 (1996).
163. See Benavides & Golten, supra note 160, at 865.
164. See Klein, supra note 162, at 226.
34 [Vol. 66: 1:1
Reforming Property Law
the laws of Spain and Mexico in accordance with Treaty provisions and
principles of international and Mexican law." 65
The CPLC confirmed more non-Pueblo community land grants as
tenancies in common than as community land grants under Mexican law.66
Confirmation of the community land grants as tenancy-in-common grants
represented a profound mistake, given that neither Spanish nor Mexican
formal law nor customary practice recognized the tenancy-in-common
form of ownership as an ownership form under which Spain or Mexico
granted land to communities. Community land grants that remained
community land grants were not subject to partition suits because
individual community members possessed no right to partition the land
under the law governing community land grants, but those that became
tenancies in common were susceptible to being partitioned.167
Two commentators have estimated that 1.6 million acres of property
(perhaps much more) in New Mexico that Mexicans had held under
Spanish or Mexican community land grants were sold under partition sales
or otherwise transferred to others after American authorities improperly
confirmed the grants as tenancies in common.1 68 In some cases, lawyers
who had represented Mexicans in the land grant confirmation process
initiated the post-confirmation partition actions and petitioned the courts
for partition by sale in these lawsuits.169 The lawyers in these cases had
acquired fractional interests in the parcels of property, sometimes totaling a
one-third or one-half undivided interest, pursuant to fee arrangements
requiring such property transfers in the many cases in which the Mexican
land grant claimants had insufficient liquid assets to pay their attorneys.170
In most instances, a subsequent partition sale of a community land
grant confirmed as a tenancy-in-common property yielded a price far below
the market value of the property in question. For example, more than
27,000 acres of communal land within a community land grant named the
Las Trampas Grant sold under a partition sale at an auction for $17,000 in
165. Benavides & Golten, supra note 160, at 866 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, sec. 13,
26 Stat. 854, 860).
166. See id. at 878.
167. See id. at 905-06.
168. Id. at 906. Mexicans who had land grants confirmed in Texas subsequently lost a significant
amount of this land as a result of partition sales. DAVID G. GUTIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS:
MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 25 (1995).
169. In many of these cases, the attorney was able to make a lowball offer because his former
clients had no money and, therefore, no ability to bid in any effective way. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND
GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 25 (1st ed. 1994).




1903, which represented about sixty cents an acre. Approximately ten
years later, the United States acquired the property in exchange for
providing its new owner with $75,000 worth of timber rights in property
located elsewhere in New Mexico, which meant that the price the 1903
auction yielded represented 23 percent of the compensation the United
States paid to the owner who had acquired the property at the 1903 auction,
assuming that there was no significant inflation during that ten-year
period.172 Part of the reason that the community land grants turned tenancy-
in-common properties sold for a fraction of their value at partition sales is
attributable to the fact that residents of community land grants who
suddenly became tenants in common were land rich but cash poor, largely
because they had functioned in a non-cash economy. As a result, not unlike
many poor and minority owners of tenancy-in-common properties in more
recent times, they had no ability to make competitive bids for the property
at the public auctions.'73
III. HISTORY OF PARTITION LAW REFORM AND SCOPE OF NCCUSL
PROJECT
A. Brief History of Partition Law Reform Efforts Prior to the UPHPA
In the decades leading up to the Uniform Law Commission's decision
to form a drafting committee to produce a uniform act addressing partition
law reform, attorneys working for various public interest and community-
based organizations, non-attorney advocates, and a number of law
professors highlighted the critical need for legal reform of state laws
impacting heirs property ownership. A number of public interest attorneys
and law professors even developed specific partition law reform proposals.
Though a very limited number of these proposed state law reforms were
fairly comprehensive,'74 most were narrowly targeted.'75 However, there
171. WILLIAM DEBUYS, ENCHANTMENT AND EXPLOITATION: THE LIFE AND HARD TIMES OF A
NEW MEXICO MOUNTAIN RANGE 174, 180, 184, 190 (1985). All told, the Town of Las Trampas
community land grant encompassed approximately 28,121 acres as approximately 1,000 acres of the
property was allotted to individual settlers. See GAO REPORT, supra note 158, at 148.
172. DEBUYS, supra note 171, at 190.
173. See Benavides & Golten, supra note 160, at 886.
174. See, e.g., THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 141, at 422-31.
175. Craig-Taylor, supra note 45, at 780-86; C. Scott Graber, Heirs Property: The Problems and
Possible Solutions, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 273, 282-84 (1978); Chris Kelley, Stemming the Loss of
Black Owned Farmland Through Partition Action -A Partial Solution, 1985 ARK. L. NOTES 35, 37-40
(1985); Lewis, supra note 28, at 390-91; Harold A. McDougall, Black Landowners Beware: A
Proposal for Statutory Reform, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 135-36 (1980); Hugo A. Pearce
III, "Heirs' Property": The Problem, Pitfalls, and Possible Solutions, 25 S.C. L. REV 151, 157-58
(1973); Rivers, supra note 40, at 68-79; Casagrande, supra note 40, at 782-83.
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was insufficient political support for any state legislature to act upon any of
the proposed comprehensive reforms.
Instead of comprehensive reform, a very small number of states
enacted into law some discrete reforms over the past few decades. These
reforms were designed to stabilize tenancy-in-common ownership in some
small ways or to make the economic impact of partition sales fairer, on the
margins, to cotenants who tried unsuccessfully to resist a court-ordered
partition sale. For example, Arkansas enacted a statute in 1985 that seeks to
discourage real estate speculators and others from purchasing small,
undivided interests in tenancy-in-common property purely in an effort to
acquire some or all of the property for themselves.17 6 The statute seeks to
accomplish this by preventing any so-called "stranger to the title" who
owns less than a 50 percent undivided interest in a parcel of property from
filing a partition action until three years after any such common owner
purchased his or her interest.'77 In North Carolina, the legislature approved
minor reforms to partition law in 2009, and these reforms included a
requirement that those petitioning for partition notify respondents that the
respondent may be able to secure free legal services;'78 an extension of the
deadline for commissioners to submit their reports specifying how property
should be divided in kind;'79 and enhanced mediation provisions.'80
In addition, the North Carolina State Bar adopted an ethics decision in
2011 that, among other things, limits the situations in which an attorney
who represented a party in a partition proceeding may serve as a court-
appointed commissioner to conduct the court-ordered sale of the property
and prohibits an attorney who represented a party in a partition proceeding
from bidding on the property on his or her own behalf.8' This ethical
opinion addressed concerns about possible conflicts of interest that can
arise between an attorney and his or her client in partition actions such as
some of the obvious conflicts of interest that arose between some attorneys
and their clients in partition actions in the early nineteenth century in New
Mexico involving former community land trusts as discussed hereinbefore.
As discussed earlier, prior to the promulgation of the UPHPA, Georgia,82
Louisiana,'83 and South Carolina 84 enacted into law statutes that provide
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-404 (2003).
177. Id. (The parcel of land must also be at least ten acres and have been purchased after June 28,
1985).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-2.1 (2013).
179. Id. § 46-17.
180. Id. § 46-22.1.
181. North Carolina State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 8 (2009) (approved Jan. 21, 2011) (discussing
service as a commissioner after having represented a party to a partition proceeding).
182. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-166.1 (2010 & Supp. 2014).
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1113 (2008) (amended 2014).
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cotenants that did not petition a court to partition property the opportunity
to buy out the undivided interest of a cotenant that petitioned the court to
partition property.
There are a number of reasons that efforts to reform partition law in the
decades preceding the drafting of the UPHPA failed for the most part. First,
the reform efforts, which were efforts restricted to certain states in the
South, did not have the support or backing of any prominent state or
national organizations with a long history of being able to influence state
legislatures.185  Second, the public interest law firms and nonprofit
organizations in certain states in the South that have worked with heirs
property owners for a number of years-owners that were mostly but not
exclusively African-American-did not have any longstanding history of
working together in a structured and coordinated way on partition law
reform efforts prior to 2006.16 Third, in states outside of the South, there
were no individuals or groups that highlighted in any significant way the
problems tenancy-in-common property owners in those states had
experienced with partition law, which helped reinforce a belief among
some that heirs property problems were confined to African-Americans
who owned property in the South.
B. Uniform Law Commission Authorized Drafting Committee to Develop
Uniform Act Narrowly Tailored to Address Land Loss Issues
The American Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Trust and
Estate Law (RPTE), through its Property Preservation Task Force, played a
major role in ultimately convincing the Uniform Law Commission to form
a committee to draft a uniform act that would address concerns that many
tenancy-in-common property owners have had with partition law.'1 7 David
Dietrich, a leading real estate attorney from Montana who now serves as
the Vice Chair of the Trust and Estates Division of RPTE, one of two vice-
chairs for the entire section, served as co-chair of the PPTF during the
entire time the task force existed. He in particular deserves a great deal of
184. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-25 (2005 & Supp. 2013).
185. See, e.g., J. Blanding Holman IV, Time to Move Forward on Heirs' Property, S.C. LAW.,
July-Aug. 2006, at 19, 25.
186. Cf Letter from John Pollock, Attorney, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center on Behalf of
the Heirs Property Retention Coalition, to NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Partition of Tenancy-in-
Common Real Property Act (Oct. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%200f/2Oheirs%20property/partition_pollockletter_
102407.pdf (indicating that the coalition was formed in 2006 with the original goal of strategizing to
impact partition reform in states throughout the country).
187. Memorandum from R. Wilson Freyermuth, Exec. Dir., Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif. Real
Prop. Acts, to NCCUSL Comm. on Scope and Program 1-2 (Dec. 31, 2006) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Freyermuth to NCCUSL].
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credit for championing the ABA's effort to address heirs property issues in
general and the ABA's effort in particular to catalyze the development of a
uniform act to reform partition law.
The PPTF and the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property
Acts (JEBURPA),1  a very important but not widely-known organization
that the Uniform Law Commission often relies upon when considering
whether to approve a uniform act in the area of real property, worked
together for approximately a year and a half beginning in 2005 to establish
general parameters for a uniform partition act project.189 The first time the
PPTF requested the JEBURPA to recommend to the ULC that it form a
drafting committee to draft a uniform partition act, the PPTF identified
some potential fundamental changes a drafting committee should consider
with respect to reforming some of the rules governing tenancy-in-common
ownership in general. Some of the possible reform ideas the PPTF
identified for possible consideration were not limited to reform of some
aspects of the law of partition as applied to tenancy-in-common ownership.
These more comprehensive ideas for possible reform, for example,
included a change to adverse possession law that would eliminate the
requirement that a cotenant in possession prove ouster in order to claim
adverse possession against his or her fellow cotenants not in possession.1 90
The JEBURPA believed that it could not support some of the "more
sweeping reform of the rules governing tenancy-in-common ownership and
partition" that the PPTF initially suggested for possible consideration
because such sweeping reform "would present more comprehensive
enactability concerns."191 After the JEBURPA made this determination, the
188. JEBURPA consists of members drawn from the Uniform Law Commission, the ABA's
Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law, and the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACTS, THE SIX-MONTH "LIMITED PRIORITY
LIEN" FOR ASSOCIATION FEES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (June 1,
2013), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/jeburpa/2013junlJEBURPAUCIOA%2OLien%2OPriority%
20Report.pdf. In addition, JEBURPA includes "liaison" representatives from the American College of
Mortgage Attorneys, the Community Associations Institute, and the American Land Title Association.
Id. It is responsible for monitoring developments in the area of real property that may impact uniform
real property acts. It is also responsible for recommending that the Uniform Law Commission form
study committees to study particular real property issues in depth as a possible precursor to drafting a
uniform real property act, as well as recommending that the Uniform Law Commission form drafting
committees to draft a uniform real property act when it believes an issue it has considered has been
adequately studied and should be addressed through t e drafting of a uniform act. See Press Release,
Meislik & Meislik, Ira Meislik Named to Joint Editorial Board for Real Property Acts (Mar. 29, 2010),
http://www.meislik.com/news/irameislikjoint editorialboard/.
189. It should be noted that one of the co-chairs of the JEBURPA, William Breetz, and one of its
emeritus members, Carl Lisman, are also Uniform Law Commissioners who ended up serving on the
drafting committee for the UPHPA.
190. June 16, 2005 Letter from Dietrich to Skinner, supra note 147, at 3.
191. Memorandum from Freyermuth to NCCUSL, supra note 187, at 2.
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PPTF and the JEBURPA worked over the course of several months "to
focus the proposal more narrowly on those specific problems with partition
that have exacerbated the problem of tenancy-in-common land loss.",192 On
November 27, 2006, the PPTF submitted an updated letter to the
JEBURPA, and this letter contained proposed reforms to partition law
only. 193
On December 31, 2006, the JEBURPA recommended that the Uniform
Law Commission form a drafting committee to draft a uniform act that
would address certain aspects of partition law that have contributed to
involuntary loss of tenancy-in-common property. In addressing the
Uniform Law Commission's criteria for approving new uniform act
projects,194 the JEBURPA determined the following: given that state law
governs partition law, the subject matter for the proposed drafting
committee was "appropriate for state legislation"; the drafting and
promulgation of a uniform partition act would promote uniformity of the
law among states "where uniformity is desirable and practicable"; there
existed "an 'obvious reason' for an act on the subject" given the fact that
tenancy-in-common land loss had been widespread and that those states
that had attempted to address the problem through legislation had not done
so in a uniform way; there was a reasonable chance that some states would
enact a uniform partition act into law; and a uniform partition act would
"produce 'significant benefits to the public through improvements in the
law' by providing a narrowly-tailored legislative remedy for an otherwise
intractable problem that has had significant social, political, and economic
consequences, particularly within poor and minority communities."l'95
On February 2, 2007, the Uniform Law Commission's Committee on
Scope and Program recommended to the ULC's Executive Committee that
it form a drafting committee to address certain aspects of partition law, and
the Executive Committee approved that recommendation on February 3,
2007.196 Given that the ULC approved its Committee on Scope and
192. Id.
193. Letter from David J. Dietrich, Co-Chair, Prop. Pres. Task Force of the Real Prop. Probate
and Trust Law Section of the A.B.A., to Shannon Skinner, Co-Chair, Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif. Real
Prop. Acts, (Nov. 27, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nov. 26, 2006 Letter from Dietrich to
Skinner]. It should be noted that in addition to the members of the PPTF that worked on this proposal,
John Pollock, a public interest attorney in Alabama, provided extraordinary assistance to the PPTF as it
prepared its proposal. The national survey of state partition law that he prepared proved to be an
invaluable resource both o the PPTF and to the UPHPA's drafting committee.
194. Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and
Consideration of Uniform and Model Acts, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Criteria%20for%/2ONew%20Projects (last visited
Aug. 6,2013).
195. Memorandum from Freyermuth to NCCUSL, supra note 187.
196. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws Meeting Minutes of the Committee on
Scope and Program: Pasadena, California, at 6 (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with author).
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Program's recommendation to form a drafting committee to address
"tenancy in common land loss,"197 more comprehensive reforms to the laws
governing tenancy-in-common ownership such as those the PPTF initially
identified for possible consideration in 2005 were clearly outside the scope
of the drafting committee's charge. Nevertheless, the drafting committee
ultimately had to decide not only which specific aspects of partition law
were relevant to addressing "tenancy-in-common land loss" but also to
which specific subset of tenancy-in-common ownership the uniform act
would apply.
IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY SECTIONS OF THE UPHPA
As indicated previously, in a global sense, the UPHPA establishes a
hierarchy of remedies for courts to apply in partition actions in which the
property at issue may be heirs property. These remedies are designed to
preserve property rights for those who own heirs property when possible
and to preserve the real estate wealth of those who own heirs property
when a court determines that the only feasible remedy in a particular case is
partition by sale. The UPHPA prioritizes affording members of the
common ownership group that want to maintain ownership of the entire
property an opportunity to maintain such ownership, in cases in which at
least one cotenant has petitioned a court for partition by sale. In such
circumstances, these cotenants are given an opportunity to buy out, on
economically fair terms, any cotenant that wants the property sold.
To the extent that the buyout provision cannot resolve the partition
action for one reason or another, under the UPHPA, there is a strong
preference for partition in kind instead of partition by sale. The UPHPA's
preference for partition in kind is quite different from the statutory
preference for partition in kind in most states, a preference that has been
hollowed out by common law decisions or by statute in many instances.m
In these jurisdictions, courts decide whether to order partition in kind or
partition by sale by considering primarily economic factors.1 99 In contrast,
the UPHPA provides substance to the preference for partition in kind by
requiring courts to consider several economic and noneconomic factors in
determining whether the preference for partition in kind may be
overcome.20 0 Finally, if a court determines that partition by sale must be
ordered, the UPHPA establishes a hierarchy of sales processes designed to
197. Id at 5.
198. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22(bl) (2013).
199. Mitchell, Malpezzi & Green, supra note 5, at 610-14.
200. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 9.
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maximize the price that property ordered sold will sell for in order to
protect the real estate wealth of tenants in common.
In addition to these major goals, the UPHPA seeks to address a number
of other issues that often arise in partition actions that present real
challenges to heirs property owners seeking to protect their property rights,
including many issues that academics have not focused upon before now.
Many of the observers who work as attorneys for state and regionally-based
public interest law firms and community-based organizations that serve
poor and minority property owners brought these issues, which have flown
under the radar for decades, to the attention of the drafting committee. This
critically important unearthing of partition law issues, unknown to most of
those on the drafting committee, underscores the invaluable role the
observers played in helping draft the UPHPA. This section provides an
analysis of many of the key sections of the UPHPA.
A. Definition of Heirs Property
Even prior to the approval of the uniform act project, there was broad
consensus that any uniform partition act should exempt certain categories
of tenancy-in-common property.201 After the drafting committee formed,
however, agreeing on what subset of tenancy-in-common property the Act
would cover proved to be a substantial challenge, perhaps the biggest
challenge the drafting committee faced during the three years it existed.
Given the primary goal of stemming involuntary loss of family property,
there was broad consensus that the committee should exclude certain types
of commercial or investment tenancy-in-common properties from the Act's
scope, such as those investors utilize in Internal Revenue Commission
§ 1031 like-kind exchange transactions.202 The ownership of these types of
tenancy-in-common property is almost universally subject to an agreement
that governs the partition of the property. The definition of "heirs property"
therefore excludes real property held in a tenancy in common in which
there is an "agreement in a record binding all the cotenants which governs
the partition of the property."20 3
Further, the drafting committee established a requirement that for
property to be "heirs property," at least one of the cotenants must have
204
acquired title from a relative as that term is defined under the act. To this
end, the act defines a "relative" as "an ascendant, descendant, or collateral
or an individual otherwise related to another individual by blood, marriage,
201. Nov. 26, 2006 Letter from Dietrich to Skinner, supra note 193, at 4.
202. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. 3.
203. Id. § 2(5)(A).
204. Id. § 2(5)(B).
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adoption, or law of this state other than this [act]."205 In applying this
definition of relative to particular cases, a transfer of an interest from an
ascendant to a descendant, such as from a parent to a child, certainly
satisfies the UPHPA's acquisition of title from a relative requirement.
However, in recognizing that property interests are transferred among
family members in other ways, both in other intergenerational ways and in
ways that involve intragenerational transfers, the Act does not require one
of the cotenants to have acquired his or her interest from a family member
who was older at the time of the transfer. Therefore, a transfer from a child
to parent would satisfy the requirement as well. Further, a transfer of an
ownership interest to one of the current cotenants from that cotenant's
sibling would satisfy the acquisition from a relative requirement, even if
the sibling who transferred the ownership interest is or was younger than
the cotenant who acquired the interest.
In addition to the requirement that at least one of the cotenants must
have acquired title from a relative, the Act establishes another requirement
for tenancy-in-common property to be considered sufficiently family-
owned to be heirs property. To this end, if one or more of the cotenants
acquired title from a relative, then one of the following criteria must also be
present:
(i) 20 percent or more of the interests are held by cotenants who are
relatives;
(ii) 20 percent or more of the interests are held by an individual
who acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased; or
206
(iii) 20 percent or more of the cotenants are relatives.
Under these family ownership criteria, the UPHPA would not apply to
"first generation" tenancy-in-common properties first established by
volition by the current group of cotenants themselves under the default
rules, even if all of the cotenants are related and even if there is no
agreement in a record governing the partition of the property.2 07 Such a
tenancy in common would not qualify as heirs property because none of the
205. Id. § 2(9).
206. Id. § 2(5)(C)(i)-(iii).
207. The decision that the UPHPA would not apply to these type of tenancies in common was
made because many members of the drafting committee, as well as the ULC's leadership, believed that
there was a need to limit the scope of the Act, though other members believed that the reforms the
UPHPA makes to partition law should apply to a much broader subset of tenancy-in-common
ownership. The drafting committee excluded "first generation" tenancies in common that are not
established by devise or intestate succession from the definition of heirs property because most
members of the drafting committee believed that the type of tenancy-in-common land loss that
influenced the ULC to establish a drafting committee in the first instance occurred in cases in which
there had been some transfer of interests in tenancy-in-common property among family members.
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cotenants could claim to have acquired title from a relative.208 In the end,
the scope of the Act is broad enough that it would apply to all or nearly all
of the types of tenancy-in-common properties that advocates for heirs
property owners have been most concerned about for decades.
Just as the drafting committee spent a considerable amount of time
establishing the scope of the UPHPA, the issue of the proper scope of the
Act inspired the most robust discussion at the Uniform Law Commission's
Annual Meeting in July 2010, where the Commission considered the Act
for final approval.2 09 Interestingly, there was quite a range of opinions
about the scope of the Act. There were some commissioners who expressed
concern that the scope of the Act was too broad, or at least that it might be
applicable to a broader range of tenancy-in-common properties than many
might appreciate.210 Others simply noted that the UPHPA appeared to be
quite narrow in scope and that the Act would not apply to most tenancy-in-
211common property owners.
There were also a few commissioners who felt that the UPHPA was not
broad enough for different reasons. Those most concerned that the Act was
too narrow were concerned that he Act's definition of "relative" would
exclude in a particular state a cotenant who is in a long-term, committed
relationship, such as a same-sex relationship with one of his or her fellow
cotenants, because these cotenants might not be eligible to be considered
related by marriage or adoption under the law of that particular state.2 12
Unless ownership of the tenancy-in-common property could otherwise
qualify as heirs property, cotenants in relationships with other cotenants
that a particular state's laws do not recognize as constituting a family
relationship would have to invoke the partition remedies available under a
state's general partition statute.
In the end, the effort to broaden the UPHPA in a way that might have
expanded the definition of family, or what it means to be related, beyond
what a particular state might currently recognize did not succeed. It fell
short because a substantial majority of the commissioners believed such an
expansion would transform the Act from one that addresses a "relatively
208. However, if at least one of the original "first generation" tenants in common acquired his or
her interest from a relative, then the tenancy in common may be deemed heirs property if the other
criteria are satisfied, even if the property is still owned exclusively by all of the original cotenants. This
could happen, for example, if the property was devised by a testator or testatrix who had sole ownership
of the property in question to a group of people, provided that the group contained at least one relative
of the testator or testatrix. In addition, this could happen if the property is transferred by intestate
succession to two or more heirs of an intestate who had sole ownership of the property.
209. Transcript of the Consideration of UPHPA at NCCUSL's 2010 Annual Meeting 13-18
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 Annual Meeting Transcript].
210. Id. at 51-54.
211. Id. at 17.
212. Id. at 100-13.
44 [Vol. 66: 1:1
Reforming Property Law
discrete issue on a relatively technical question and make it subject to a
much broader debate, which will make it very unlikely in many states that
the act would ever be passed."2 13 Even so, it is interesting to note that the
discussion about this effort to broaden the Act consumed more time than
the discussion about any other issue during the Commission's consideration
of the Act for final approval, which surprised many members of the
drafting committee who had anticipated that there might have been robust
discussion about a perceived need to narrow the scope of the Act.
B. Applicability: Requiring Courts in All Partition Actions to Determine if
the UPHPA May Apply
Under the UPHPA, those who own heirs property, as defined by the
Act, who end up being either plaintiffs or defendants in partition actions are
likely to have their cases decided under the UPHPA. Under the UPHPA, in
every partition action within a jurisdiction that enacts the UPHPA into law,
a court must determine if the property that is the subject of the action is
heirs property. If the court so determines, "the property must be partitioned
under this [act] unless all of the cotenants otherwise agree in a record."2 14
Though this applicability section of the UPHPA constitutes a technical
litigation procedural issue, which some but not other commissioners
considered unusual,215 the drafting committee believed that this provision
provides essential protections to many owners of heirs property, though
such legal protections may not be obvious to those who are not experienced
litigators. Heirs property owners are often only served by publication in
partition actions which means that many never end up appearing in the
actions.216 Other heirs property owners are often unrepresented by attorneys
in partition actions because they lack the financial resources to hire
attorneys, which renders them vulnerable.2 17 Some of these owners who
lack an attorney choose not to proceed pro se, while others represent
themselves in an ineffective way because they lack any sophisticated
knowledge of the law.218 In sum, many heirs property owners who have
little access to legal services would lack sufficient information to be able to
213. Id. at 103.
214. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 3(b).
215. 2010 Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 209, at 34-38. Commissioner Barbara Ann
Atwood from Arizona believed that this procedure would require courts in partition actions to function
"more like a German court .. . in a civil system where the court is an active investigator." See id. at 36.
In contrast, Commissioner Lee Yeakel from Texas, a federal district court judge who previously served
as a state court judge, indicated that as a judge he didn't "find this [procedure] either unusual or
burdensome." See id. at 37-38.





invoke the UPHPA in those instances in which these owners were to
become parties to a partition action.
Finally, the drafting committee believed that in many partition actions,
the only cotenant who would realize that the property may qualify as heirs
property is the cotenant who petitioned the court to order a partition sale
and who hopes to acquire the property for a fraction of its value.2 19 Such a
cotenant would have little incentive to file a motion or to petition the court
in some other way, requesting the court in a state that had enacted the
UPHPA into law to determine whether the property in question qualifies as
heirs property. There would be a disincentive for such a cotenant to file
such a motion because if it was determined that the property was heirs
property and that the UPHPA would then apply, the nonpetitioning
cotenants would have greater legal rights than such nonpetitioning
cotenants would have under general partition laws.220
C. Notice by Posting
Many of the observers claimed that many cotenant defendants in
partition actions who have not participated in the actions-and as a result
have often been the subject of default judgments-received only service by
publication, despite the fact that the plaintiffs in these actions could have
identified and located these defendants using reasonable diligence.22 1 Some
of the observers even claimed that in some partition actions the plaintiffs in
fact knew the residences of the nonresident defendants who were served by
publication.222 To this end, depending upon the jurisdiction, service by
publication in partition actions may be sufficient if cotenant defendants are
known but unlocatable,2 23 unknown,2 24 or nonresidents of the state where
the action was filed.225
The drafting committee was quite concerned that many cotenant
defendants in partition actions do not participate in such actions because
insufficient (though perhaps minimally constitutionally-valid) notice of
these actions was provided to them.226 The drafting committee was even
more concerned that permitting service by publication in partition actions
for nonresident defendants whose addresses or locations are known by a
plaintiff, or could be known by a plaintiff using reasonable diligence, may
219. Id. at 36-38.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 46-47.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., TEx. R. Civ. P. 758.
224. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-30 (2005).
225. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-307 (2005 & Supp. 2013).
226. 2010 Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 209, at 46-47.
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violate federal due process requirements.227 However, in accordance with
one of the Uniform Law Commission's general guidelines, the drafting
committee ultimately decided against developing specialized procedural
rules establishing the circumstances under which plaintiffs may use service
by publication in partition actions that the UPHPA may govern.228
In lieu of developing specialized procedural rules governing the
conditions under which service by publication may be made in partition
actions, the UPHPA requires that in cases in which a plaintiff seeks an
order of notice of publication and a court determines that the property in
question may be heirs property, the plaintiff post a conspicuous sign on the
property.229 This requirement is similar to provisions found in some state
statutes that require a sign or notice to be posted, under certain
circumstances, on real property scheduled to be sold pursuant to a court
order.230 If the plaintiff must post a sign, in addition to stating that the
partition action has commenced and identifying the name and address of
the court, the sign must identify "the common designation by which the
property is known,"231 such as "the Hazel Jones estate," for example. The
UPHPA's drafters believe the signage requirement will increase the
227. Though in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), the
Supreme Court indicated that personal service has very "often been held unnecessary as to
nonresidents," some members of the drafting committee were skeptical that service by publication to
nonresidents who own interests in tenancy-in-common property is constitutional in those cases in which
the plaintiffs know the addresses of these nonresident defendants or could discover the addresses using
reasonable diligence. To this end, in Mullane, the Supreme Court further stated the following: "Where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear
for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency." Id. at 3 18. Though courts
across the country do not appear to have decided in a uniform way whether nonresidents with known
addresses in partition actions may be served by publication, certain state courts have held, at least in
certain types of cases, that service by publication to nonresident parties whose residence is known or
reasonably ascertainable by the party who provided service by publication constitutes a denial of due
process under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. See, e.g., Baggett v. Baggett, 541 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tenn. 1976) (It must be noted that this case
was a case considering the sufficiency of service by publication to a nonresident spouse in a divorce
case and that the case was not a partition action.).
228. This decision was consistent with the Uniform Law Commission's more general policy of
refraining from developing specialized procedural rules for uniform acts that are primarily substantive
in nature. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69
WASH. L. REv. 361, 378 (1994).
229. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 4(b). The Alabama Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act that
will begin applying to partition actions filed in Alabama on or after January 1, 2015 further requires that
the sign be durable and that it must be "at least 11 x 17 inches in size." ALA. CODE § 35-6A-4 (Supp.
2014).
230. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-18266 (2006).
231. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 4(b). The requirement that the sign identify the property by its
common designation addresses the fact that a property is often commonly known by the property's
street address or by some unofficial name, including the name of the family that has owned the property
for a long period of time. For example, as indicated above, many people in a rural community may
commonly refer to a hypothetical property as the Hazel Jones estate.
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chances that a defendant whom the plaintiff served by publication in a
partition action may end up participating in the action.
D. Qualifications for Court-Appointed Commissioners or Referees
In most jurisdictions, any commissioner or referee whom a court
appoints in a partition action must be disinterested,232 and in some states,
statutes deem certain people ineligible to serve as a commissioner or
referee.233 In some states, the relevant partition statute only explicitly
provides for the appointment of commissioners or referees if the court
orders a division in kind and in all or nearly all of these states any
commissioner or referee who is appointed must be disinterested.234 In some
states, however, statutes do not address whether a commissioner, referee, or
officer, whom a court has appointed to sell property in a partition action,
must be disinterested.2 35
In a small number of states, courts that have ultimately ordered a
partition sale have allowed someone who participated in the partition action
on behalf of one of the parties before the court ordered the property sold,
including an attorney or witness for one of the parties, to serve as a
commissioner or referee to make the sale.236 To this end, in permitting a
real estate agent who had served as a witness for one of the parties to serve
as the commissioner for the sale of the property, an Indiana appellate court
held that "[t]he statute governing the appointment of a commissioner to sell
land does not require that the commissioner be disinterested, unlike the
statute regarding commissioners for the partition of land." 237 The court
justified this distinction as follows:
If allowed, interested commissioners could easily prejudice one
cotenant while physically partitioning land because the cotenants
necessarily have adverse interests. However, there is not so much
to gain, if anything, from an interested commissioner when selling
property because, as Defendants have noted, all parties have the
common objective of maximizing the sales price.238
In West Virginia, which also has a statute that does not require
commissioners appointed to make judicial sales including partition sales to
232. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 241, § 12 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
233. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 873.050 (West 1980).
234. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 915 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2013).
235. Id. at§ 231.





be disinterested,2 39 courts apparently usually appoint the attorney who
represented the plaintiff to serve as the commissioner to sell property
ordered sold in a partition action.240
The ULC approved the formation of a drafting committee to address
problems with partition actions in large part because of the many
documented cases in which a cotenant initiated a partition action requesting
the court to order partition by sale and then ended up purchasing the
property at the partition sale at a fire sale price. In many of these cases, it
seems clear that this is the result the petitioning cotenant had hoped for all
along. The drafting committee therefore rejected the notion that in all
partition actions in which courts order property sold, all of the parties
desire to maximize the sales price and that, therefore, court-appointed
commissioners do not have to be disinterested. In addressing the property
qualifications or disqualifications for any court-appointed commissioner or
referee more generally, the UPHPA prescribes that any commissioner or
referee "must be disinterested and impartial and not a party to or a
participant in the action."2 41
E. Courts to Determine Value ofProperty
Under the UPHPA, if a court determines that property in a partition
action constitutes heirs property, the court then must further determine the
value of the property, which in almost all instances will mean the fair
242market value of the property.22 This valuation must be done before the
court considers the merits of the partition action.243 Though this
requirement is quite unusual in comparison to general partition law statutes
in states throughout the United States,24 4 the requirement serves two
important purposes. First, the valuation enables the buying out of a
cotenant's interest, pursuant to section 7 of the UPHPA, to occur. To this
end, the price at which a cotenant can be bought out under section 7 can
only be determined after a court first determines the value of the property
239. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12-1 (LexisNexis 2008).
240. Carney v. Carney Splice Protector Co., 168 S.E. 478, 478 (W. Va. 1933).
241. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 5.
242. Id. § 6.
243. Id. § 6(g).
244. New Mexico represents one of the very few, if not the only, states that requires property that
is the subject of a partition action to be appraised before the court can order a partition in kind or a
partition by sale under certain circumstances. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-7 (LexisNexis 1978). This
New Mexico statutory requirement, however, is more limited than the UPHPA's requirement that a
court determine the value of heirs property before it considers the merits of a partition action. In New
Mexico, a court must only determine the value of property in a partition action if the commissioners
advise the court that if the property in question were to be partitioned in kind it would result in manifest
prejudice to the cotenants as a whole. See id.
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as a whole. Second, given that the UPHPA requires that property ordered
sold under a partition by sale should be sold in most cases by open-market
sale in which a real estate broker must list the property for not less than its
court-determined value, it is first necessary for the court to determine the
value of the property.
In determining the fair market value of heirs property, unless one of
two exceptions apply, a court must appoint a real estate appraiser licensed
in the state in which the heirs property is located to appraise the property
"assuming sole ownership of the fee simple estate."2 45 Those who
participated in the drafting of the UPHPA recognized that requiring an
appraisal to be done in a partition action represents a cost that the parties
must bear. Recognizing that he cost of an appraisal in some cases may be
too high, the UPHPA provides a court with some discretion to forego
appointing an appraiser if the court determines that "the evidentiary value
of an appraisal is outweighed by the cost of the appraisal."246 In such
circumstances, instead of requiring an appraisal to be done, the court shall
hold an evidentiary hearing and then establish the fair market value of the
property by considering evidence, other than a court-ordered appraisal,
about the value of the property.24 7
Moreover, instead of a court determining the fair market value of
property in a partition action that has been determined to be heirs property,
the UPHPA enables the cotenants in a partition action to establish the value
of the heirs property themselves-whether such value is purportedly at,
above, or below the property's fair market value-or to agree upon another
method of valuation that will yield a value for the property. 248 However, an
agreement in which the cotenants establish the value of the heirs property
themselves or another method of valuation must be an agreement reached
by all of the cotenants. A court cannot accept such an agreement even if the
only cotenants who did not agree are unknown, unlocatable, or otherwise
are cotenants who remain unascertained.
245. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 6(d).
246. Id. § 6(c).
247. Id.
248. Id. § 6(b). Other methods of valuation that the cotenants may agree to use include using one
or more real estate broker's opinion of value, a valuation method that is almost always less expensive
than the cost of an appraisal. See id. § 6(b) cmt. It should be noted that cotenants in a partition case
governed under the UPHPA may want to establish the value of the property that is the subject of the
action by themselves to limit the costs of the action or they may have non-economic reasons for
wanting to determine the value themselves.
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F. Cotenant Buyout
The UPHPA's buyout provision is significantly different than the
buyout provisions currently available in partition actions under the law of
various states, including the three states that have buyout provisions that
ostensibly make a buyout remedy available only to cotenants who are
deemed to be nonpetitioning cotenants under those statutes. The UPHPA
only subjects the interest of a cotenant that requested partition by sale to be
bought out and only a cotenant that had never requested partition by sale
may buy out that interest.249 The drafting committee recognized that unlike
a nonpetitioning cotenant or a cotenant that petitioned a court for partition
in kind, a cotenant that petitions a court for partition by sale has
unequivocally signaled his willingness to have his real property interest
extinguished in exchange for a monetary payment.2 50
The purchase price for the interest of a cotenant that petitioned the
court for partition by sale is "the value of the entire parcel determined
under Section 6 multiplied by the [petitioning] cotenant's fractional
249. Id. § 7(a). The UPHPA's buyout provision bears some resemblances to the Alabama
statutory buyout provision that the Alabama Supreme Court in Jolly v. Knopf 463 So. 2d 150, 153 (Ala.
1985), determined violated state and federal equal protection provisions in that the only interests that
are subject to being bought out mandatorily are interests of a cotenant that petitioned a court for
partition by sale, and only cotenants that did not petition a court for partition by sale are eligible to buy
out such interests. As discussed hereinbefore, the Jolly court's equal protection analysis is very
questionable as the Alabama Supreme Court itself subsequently made clear in a 1999 opinion. See
supra Part II.B.2.c.3. Moreover, even if the current Alabama Supreme Court would consider Jolly still
to be good law, the UPHPA's buyout provision is distinguishable from the buyout provision considered
by the Jolly court in terms of the legislative purposes of the two different statutes. In Jolly, the Alabama
Supreme Court noted that the legislative purpose of the statute it ruled unconstitutional, in terms of how
the buyout provision favored nonpetitioning defendants over cotenants that had petitioned a court for
partition by sale, was to provide co-owners in general with protections against other co-owners that
request a court to order the co-owned land to be forcibly sold for a pro rata distribution of the sale
proceeds. Jolly, 463 So. 2d at 153; see also 1 JESSE P. EVANS Ill, ALABAMA PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES, 11-26 (5th ed. 2012).
Chief Justice Torbert suggested in his special concurrence that if the statute had been more
narrowly tailored "to preserve family estates by preventing title from passing to a stranger" as he
believed was the real intent of the statute instead of applying to "any property held by 'joint owners or
tenants in common' the statute would have been deemed constitutional. Cf Jolly, 463 So. 2d at 154
(emphasis in original). In contrast to the statute at issue in Jolly, the UPHPA was drafted specifically to
alleviate tenancy-in-common land loss for families that own heirs property. To this end, the UPHPA
can be distinguished from the statute at issue in Jolly in three ways. First, in contrast to the statute at
issue in Jolly that applied to property held by joint owners or tenants in common, the UPHPA only
applies to tenancy-in-common property. Second, the UPHPA only applies to tenancy-in-common
property owned by family members in substantial part. Third, the UPHPA does not apply to all tenancy-
in-common property that is substantially owned by families but only to such family-owned tenancies in
common in which at least one cotenant acquired title from a relative.
250. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. 3. Many cotenants that petition courts for partition by sale do
not end up bidding on the property at the partition sale. Though other cotenants that petition courts for
partition by sale do intend to participate in the bidding at any partition sales courts may order, these
cotenants, of course, have no legitimate guarantee that they will be the winning bidders.
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ownership of the entire parcel."25 1 In comparison to buyout provisions
contained in many tenancy-in-common agreements that utilize discounts of
one type or another to value the interest of a cotenant that may be bought
out, the UPHPA's formula for determining the purchase price for the
interest of the cotenant hat petitioned the court for partition by sale is quite
generous.252 More generally, tenants in common who sell their fractional
interests voluntarily normally receive substantially discounted sales prices
for their interests in part because tenancy-in-common ownership represents
a particularly unstable form of ownership.253 The drafting committee
concluded that providing cotenants that petitioned courts for partition by
sale with somewhat more compensation than they normally could expect
from arms-length, negotiated sales of their interests-or from distributions
from forced partition sales conducted under general partition statutes-is
reasonable, taking into account the fact that the UPHPA mandates that
those who petition courts for partition by sale are subject to having their
interests involuntarily bought out.2 54
Under the UPHPA's buyout provision, any cotenant that did not
petition the court for partition by sale "may buy all the interests of the
cotenants that requested partition by sale."255 However, if more than one
eligible cotenant elects to buy the interests of the cotenants that petitioned
for partition by sale, "the court shall allocate to the cotenants the right to
buy those interests among the lecting cotenants based on each electing
cotenant's existing fractional ownership of the entire parcel divided by the
total existing fractional ownership of all cotenants electing to buy."256
Unlike the Georgia2 57 and South Carolina2 58 statutes that provide a
mechanism for cotenant buyout, the UPHPA contains an explicit savings
clause that permits electing cotenants that paid their apportioned purchase
price to pay within a discrete period of time the entire purchase price for
any interests that were not purchased in the first round of the buyout due to
251. Id. § 7(c).
252. For example, a model tenancy-in-common agreement that the ABA's Property Preservation
Task Force made available to the public contained the following formula that is to be used to determine
the discounted price cotenants that do not want to partition a particular parcel of property subject to the
tenancy-in-common agreement have to pay to buy out the interest of a cotenant who desires to file a
partition action: "(I) the Property's appraised value, times (ii) the partitioning Owner's percentage
ownership interest in the Property, times (iii) .75." Model Tenancy in Common Agreement (formerly
available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=RPO18700) (on file with author).
253. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 7 cmt 5.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 7(a).
256. Id. § 7(d)(2).
257. GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-6-166.1(e)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
258. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-25(E) (2005 & Supp. 2013).
[Vol. 66: 1:152
Reforming Property Law
the fact that one or more other electing cotenants failed to pay their
apportioned purchase price on time.259
The UPHPA's buyout provision not only seeks to promote greater
continuity of ownership for those who own heirs property, but it also seeks
to enable consolidation of tenancy-in-common properties in some limited
ways that may make the ownership more manageable going forward. A
successful buyout under the UPHPA of the interests of those in a particular
case that petitioned a court for partition by sale will itself result in a
tenancy in common that is more consolidated. In some cases the
consolidation may be fairly robust, but in others it may be quite modest.
Further, the UPHPA's buyout provision provides for a possible second
buyout by cotenants who did not petition for partition by sale and who
appeared in the partition action of "the interests of cotenants named as
defendants and served with the complaint but that did not appear in the
action."260
Though this second discretionary buyout could have substantial
benefits in terms of consolidating ownership among a significantly smaller,
more active group of cotenants, the drafting committee deliberately
structured this second buyout so that it would not undermine other
important principles the drafting committee considered important. First,
any sale of interests under the second buyout may only occur after a buyout
of the interests of cotenants that petitioned the court for partition by sale
has been completed.26 1 The UPHPA's buyout section is structured in this
way because the drafting committee believed that providing for
simultaneous, nondiscretionary buyouts of the interests of cotenants that
petitioned a court for partition by sale, and of the interests of non-appearing
cotenants, could result in many eligible cotenants who would like to utilize
the buyout provision failing to do so. This could occur simply because
these eligible cotenants might have insufficient money to buy out all those
interests that would be subject to such a simultaneous sale. To this end,
many, if not most, cotenants eligible to buyout interests would need to
draw upon personal savings or other liquid assets because lenders almost
never allow tenants in common to use their fractional ownership interests
as collateral to secure loans, as indicated previously.
The drafting committee also decided that courts should have discretion
to authorize or reject any request for a buyout of interests of non-appearing
cotenants. Provision for this possible second buyout takes into account the
fact that sometimes cotenants that do not participate in partition actions are
inactive cotenants that have done little to help maintain the property, or are
259. UPHPA, supra note 1, §§ 7(e)(3)f).
260. Id. §§ 7(g)-(h).
261. Id. § 7(h)(1).
2014] 53
Alabama Law Review
cotenants who are indifferent with respect to receiving money for their
interests, as opposed to maintaining their ownership interests in heirs
property. However, the drafters also recognized that some cotenants who
do not participate in partition actions do not do so because they never
received effective notice of the partition action. Others do not participate,
for example, because they do not have the financial resources to hire an
attorney to enable them to participate in the partition action in a meaningful
way. Still others do not participate for other legitimate reasons.
G. Reinstating or Fortifying the Preference for Partition in Kind
Many, but not all, partition actions involving heirs property could be
completely resolved under the UPHPA's buyout provision. There are three
circumstances under which the UPHPA's buyout provision could not help a
court completely resolve a partition action. First, there are cases in which a
cotenant or cotenants have only petitioned a court for partition in kind,
which would render the buyout provision inapplicable. Second, the buyout
provision would not resolve a partition action subject to the UPHPA if
eligible cotenants do not purchase all of the interests of cotenants that
petitioned a court for partition by sale.2 62 Further, even if there were a
successful buyout of all the interests of cotenants that petitioned a court for
partition by sale, if there is at least one cotenant that still requests partition
in kind at the conclusion of the buyout, the court must proceed to resolve
the case in some other way.
The UPHPA maintains the preference for partition in kind that is found
in the clear majority of general state partition statutes which require a court
to order partition in kind unless this remedy would result in great prejudice,
substantial injury, or some other similar formulation of the prejudice
standard.26 3 In seeking to make partition in kind more feasible in some
cases, the UPHPA explicitly gives cotenants the right to aggregate their
interests to make division more possible;264 requires courts to consider
interests held by cotenants that are unknown, unlocatable, or the subject of
a default judgment as one unit;265 and explicitly permits a court to use
owelty to make partition in kind feasible in those instances in which it
might otherwise be impracticable.266 Under the UPHPA, if partition in kind
would result in great prejudice or manifest prejudice, a court must order
262. Id. §§ 7(e)(2)f)(2).
263. Id. § 8(a); Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 513.
264. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 8(a).
265. Id. § 8(d).
266. Id. § 8(c).
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partition by sale unless no cotenant petitioned the court for partition by
sale. In the latter instance, a court must dismiss the partition action.267
Though on the surface the UPHPA is simply consistent with general
partition statutes throughout the country in preferring partition in kind to
partition by sale, the UPHPA provides real substance to this preference. In
contrast, the preference under general state partition statutes has been
substantially undercut as discussed earlier by courts that apply purely
economic testS268 or tests that explicitly make any noneconomic
considerations subordinate to economic considerations.2 6 9 Therefore, the
standard that a court must use under the UPHPA to determine whether
partition in kind would result in great or manifest prejudice to the cotenants
as a group represents a very substantial reform to the extant partition law
under general partition statutes, which in many instances has become a de
facto preference for partition by sale. In determining whether partition in
kind is feasible under the UPHPA, a court must weigh the totality of all
relevant factors and circumstances consistent with an approach used by a
very small minority of states in partition actions arising under general state
270
partition laws.
The factors a court must weigh in deciding whether partition in kind is
feasible under the UPHPA include a number of economic and
noneconomic factors.2 71 First, a court simply must consider whether the
property practicably can be divided. Second, a court must consider whether
the aggregate fair market value of the parcels that would result from a
division in kind would be materially less than the value of the property if it
were sold as a whole, provided that a court must take into account the
economic condition under which a partition sale would occur. Third, a
court must consider any evidence of longstanding family ownership or
possession of the property "by a cotenant and one or more predecessors in
title or predecessors in possession to the cotenant who are or were relatives
of the cotenant or each other."272 Fourth, a court must consider any
cotenant's sentimental attachment to the property, including attachment
that arises because the property has ancestral or other unique value. Fifth, a
court must consider any cotenant's lawful use of the property and the
267. Id. § 8(a). This provision of the UPHPA seeks to address the fact that there are cases in
which courts have ordered partition by sale notwithstanding the fact that, though one or more of the
cotenants petitioned the court for partition in kind, none of the cotenants ever petitioned the court for
partition by sale. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153.
268. See, e.g., Ashley v. Baker, 867 P.2d 792, 796 (Alaska 1994).
269. See, e.g., Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977).
270. See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980); Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405,
409-411 (S.D. 1997); Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.2d. 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004).
271. UPHPA, supra note 1, §§ 9(a)(l)-(7).
272. Id. at § 9(a)(3).
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extent to which such a cotenant would be harmed if such a cotenant could
not continue to use the property in the same lawful way as a result of the
partition action. The lawful uses that a court may consider can include
residential or commercial uses. Sixth, a court must consider the extent to
which the cotenants have been responsible in terms of contributing their
pro rata shares of the carrying charges, such as the property taxes and the
property insurance, or in contributing to physically improving and
maintaining the property. In addition to these six factors, a court shall
consider any other relevant factor.
Unlike states that use an economics-only test or a test that subordinates
any noneconomic considerations to economic factors in deciding whether
partition in kind is feasible, a court deciding whether partition in kind is
feasible under the UPHPA may not decide that one factor is dispositive
without weighing all other relevant factors and circumstances.273 In sum,
the UPHPA does not make noneconomic considerations a court may
consider in deciding how to partition property subordinate to economic
considerations, or economic concerns subordinate to noneconomic
concerns for that matter.
H. Reforming Partition Sales Procedures to Increase Sales Prices
Though the UPHPA's provision for cotenant buyout and the statute's
fortification of the preference for partition in kind were designed to reduce
the frequency with which courts order partition sales of family-owned
property in jurisdictions that enact the UPHPA into law, of course there
still will be instances in which courts resolve partition actions appropriately
by ordering partition by sale. In recognizing this fact, the drafting
committee for the UPHPA sought to ensure that partition sales under the
UPHPA do not end up causing tenancy-in-common owners significant or
even devastating economic harm. Under the UPHPA, partition sales should
be conducted in ways that are dramatically different from the way in which
a typical partition sale is conducted in jurisdictions throughout the United
States. As a result, under the UPHPA, heirs property owners should receive
more value (and in many cases significantly more value) for their property
interests than heretofore has been the case under partition sales conducted
under general state partition laws. The changes the UPHPA makes to the
partition sale process are also likely to serve as a strong disincentive to
cotenants who might otherwise be motivated to file a partition action in
which they would request partition by sale solely or in large part because
they hope to purchase the property for themselves at a fire sale price.
273. Id. § 9(b).
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Under the UPHPA, a partition sale is required to be "an open-market
sale unless the court finds that a sale by sealed bids or an auction would be
more economically advantageous and in the best interest of the cotenants as
a group."2 74 If a court orders that a partition sale will be an open-market
sale, the court will appoint a licensed, real estate broker to offer the
property for sale.275 Consistent with other provisions of the UPHPA that
seek to provide the parties with some significant control over different
aspects of the partition action, the parties first have the opportunity to agree
upon which real estate broker the court shall appoint.276 If the parties do not
agree upon the selection of a real estate broker within ten days of a court's
decision to order an open-market sale, the court will appoint a disinterested,
licensed, real estate broker.7 Any real estate broker appointed by a court
in a partition action to offer property for sale by open-market sale, "shall
offer the property for sale in a commercially reasonable manner at a price
no lower than the determination of value and on the terms and conditions
established by the court."278 In short, if a court in a partition action orders
partition by sale by open-market sale, a real estate broker appointed to offer
the property for sale should seek to sell the property in question in much
the same way such a broker would seek to sell property he or she offers for
sale on behalf of a willing seller who voluntarily seeks to sell her property.
The UPHPA accounts for the fact that properties offered for sale by
open-market sale may in a substantial percentage of cases generate offers
for at least the court-determined valuation and for those instances in which
a court-appointed broker may not receive an offer for the court-determined
valuation within a reasonable period of time. In the former circumstances,
the broker shall file a report of the sale that complies with the UPHPA's
reporting requirements.2 79 After a broker files such a report with a court,
the sale may be completed in accordance with state law provisions other
than the provisions of the UPHPA.280
274. Id. § 10(a).
275. Id. § 10(b). A very limited number of courts in a small number of states in the United States
have ordered that partition sales be conducted in a way that approximates how property is typically
offered for sale by sellers under fair market value conditions, conditions which typically include the use
of a real estate broker in the effort to sell the property. See, e.g., McCorison v. Warner, 859 A.2d 609,
614 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (ordering that the property be listed by a real estate broker for up to two
years provided that at least 25 percent of the parties agreed to continue to have the property listed by a
broker after the first year if the property had not been sold by that time); Orgain v. Butler, 496 S.E.2d
433, 435 (Va. 1998) (reversing chancellor's order that property be sold at a public auction because the
property would yield a much better price if it were offered for sale on the open market by a real estate
broker).
276. UPHPA, supra note 1, § 10(b).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. §§ 10(c)(1), 11.
280. Id. § 10(c)(2).
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In the circumstance in which a court-appointed broker does not receive
an offer for the court-determined valuation within a reasonable period of
time, the court has several options. First, the court can simply approve the
highest outstanding offer if there is such an offer 8 ' and then the sale can be
completed consistent with how a sale may be completed if the broker had
received an offer for at least the court-determined value within a reasonable
time. Second, the court can redetermine the value of the property and then
order that the broker should continue to offer the property for sale for some
additional period of time.282 Third, the court can determine that it is no
longer feasible to continue to offer the property for sale by open-market
sale and can instead order that the property be sold by sealed bids or at an
auction.28 3 In any case in which a court orders a sale by sealed bids or an
auction, the court must set the terms and conditions of the sale.284 This is
the case whether the sale by sealed bids or the auction was ordered in the
first instance or only after a court determines that it would be unwise to
continue to offer property that is the subject of a partition action for sale by
open-market sale after the lapse of a reasonable period of time in which no
offer for the court determined value was made. Such terms and conditions
for a sale by sealed bids or an auction could include, for example, a reserve
price below which the property may not be sold.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of the UPHPA culminating in its promulgation in
2010, and its enactment into law in four states thus far, including two in the
heart of the South, represents a truly remarkable legal development that
very few people believed to be achievable up until just a few years ago.
Many different people played key roles, and some played simply
indispensable roles, in the drive to convince the ULC to form a drafting
committee to develop a uniform partition act and in the drafting of the
UPHPA over the course of three years. Many others are making important
contributions to the ongoing advocacy work that is being done to convince
states to enact the UPHPA into law, including staff at the ULC, many
members of the HPRC, this author, and others. The commissioners on the
drafting committee, including some with long experience in drafting
uniform real property acts, the ABA advisors, an unusually varied and
committed group of observers, including many from local and regional
public interest legal organizations that had never previously participated in
281. Id. § 10(d)(1).
282. Id. § 10(d)(2).
283. Id. § 10(d)(3).
284. Id. § 10(e).
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the process of drafting any uniform act, and this author in my role as
Reporter for the UPHPA, ended up working very well together and forming
a real esprit de corps.
The drafting committee was often able to reach compromises that
satisfied most or all of the members of the drafting committee and the
observers. However, the issue of the circumstances in which attorney's fees
could be awarded in partition actions under the UPHPA was decided in a
way that left some members of the drafting committee and an even larger
number of the observers dissatisfied, at least at the time this decision was
made. The UPHPA drafts up until the final meeting of the drafting
committee included significant language restricting the ability of a court to
award attorney's fees in a partition action, consistent with the American
rule on attorney's fees.285 However, the ULC's leadership expressed serious
concern at the final drafting committee meeting that such a provision on
attorney's fees could harm enactment efforts in some states that otherwise
might be inclined to enact the UPHPA into law. After hearing this concern,
the commissioners on the drafting committee decided in the end against
including any provision in the UPHPA that would restrict the ability of a
court to award attorney's fees in partition actions decided under the
UPHPA.286
Even though the UPHPA as approved does not prohibit a court from
making an attorney's fee award in a contested partition, the act does
include significant provisions that serve as "shark repellant" as one law
professor stated in a written submission to the drafting committee,287 for
those cotenants interested in forcing the sale of family-owned, tenancy-in-
common property in the hopes that such a cotenant could acquire the
property for a fire sale price. Among other provisions that would
disincentivize such a cotenant from filing a partition action in order to
acquire family-owned property are the buyout provision, the provision
fortifying the preference for partition in kind, and the provision requiring
285. See, e.g., Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif State Laws, UPHPA May 2009 Interim
Draft, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20of/20heirs%20property/upipacleandraft-may0
9.pdf; Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, UPHPA March 26-27, 2010 Committee
Meeting Draft, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20of/o20heirs%20property/upipa mtgdraft clean
031110.pdf.
286. The drafting committee's decision to strike any language from the UPHPA that would
prohibit a court from making an attorney's fee award does appear to have been helpful in the ultimately
successful effort to enact the UPHPA into law in Alabama. In enacting the UPHPA into law in
Alabama, the Alabama legislature added language to the UPHPA making it clear that the Alabama
Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act does not make any changes to the provision in Alabama's
general partition law that permits a court to award attorney's fees in a partition action. See ALA. CODE §
35-6A-3(d) (Thomson Reuters Supp. 2014).
287. See E-mail from Hugh C. Macgill, supra note 155.
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that partition sales be conducted in a manner designed to maximize the
sales price with the open-market sale representing the preferred sales
method.
Though the UPHPA represents the most substantial reform effort in
modem times to reinforce family ownership of tenancy-in-common
property in the United States, it does not address every challenge those who
own heirs property face. Many families still own heirs property that could
be better consolidated under the family's continued ownership so that the
property could be better utilized. Given that the UPHPA provides for
consolidation mostly on the margins, a family interested in consolidating
their tenancy-in-common ownership would have to pursue other strategies
in most instances to seek such consolidation. These strategies could include
private ordering strategies such as converting a family's tenancy-in-
common ownership into another form of common ownership such as a
limited liability company. Additional law reform efforts also could be
pursued that might include a statute that would enable those owning a
supermajority of the interests in a tenancy in common to change their
ownership form into a form that is more functional, including a limited
liability company, as opposed to the current state laws that require all the
cotenants to agree to such a change.28 8
Further, many who own heirs property are unable to improve their
property in any significant way or to use their property to develop income-
generating activities and wealth that can help them move beyond being
merely "land rich but cash poor," a typical economic condition for a
substantial number of heirs property owners. This substantial
underdevelopment of heirs property holdings is attributable in part to the
fact that those who own heirs property are often unable to secure financing
so that they can realize the potential economic value of their tenancy-in-
common ownership. To this end, lending institutions typically refuse to
accept heirs property as collateral for loans due to concerns that those who
own heirs property lack clear title. A number of initiatives could be
undertaken in an effort to help convince private and government lenders to
make financing more available to those who own heirs property.
Nevertheless, in those states that have enacted the UPHPA into law,
heirs property owners now possess substantial new legal protections and
rights that those who have worked with heirs property owners for decades
had long sought, though the chance of securing these rights seemed quite
small until the Uniform Law Commission decided to begin work on
drafting the UPHPA. In addition to the four states that have enacted the
288. See Mitchell, Reconstruction, supra note 34, at 568-72.
289. See Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A
Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 557, 578-79 (2005).
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UPHPA into law, a number of other states from many different regions of
the country are likely to consider it over the course of the next few years
according to the legislative counsel staff member at the ULC who is
working to help enact the UPHPA into law. The UPHPA concededly offers
no benefits to the substantial number of heirs property owners who have
already involuntarily lost their property in partition actions over the course
of the past several decades. Nevertheless, the enactments and potential
enactments of the UPHPA are significant because poor and disadvantaged
heirs property owners own more property than many people realize. For
example, African-Americans own several million more acres of agricultural
land alone, worth several billion dollars, than most academics have
realized,289 including many academics who have suggested that black
landowners are on the verge of extinction. Much of this agricultural land is
heirs property. Further, the UPHPA stands to benefit the large number of
families that own heirs property that is not agricultural land whether the
properties are located in cities, along the oceanfront, or in rural locations.
Finally, the effort to reform partition law by drafting a uniform
partition act has had other noteworthy, secondary benefits that hold the
potential to build upon the progress that has been made in reforming
partition law to provide heirs property owners with more stable ownership.
For example, important relationships were forged during the drafting of the
UPHPA, including among members of the Heirs' Property Retention
Coalition that had not had a history of working together in any substantial
way before 2006. There is a fair chance at least that these new (or at least
improved) relationships could be leveraged in a meaningful way to help
address other significant problems heirs property owners face. More
broadly, the UPHPA's very solid record of introductions and enactments
should be drawn upon as an instructive case study to help convince various
important legal actors that property law can be reformed in a constructive
way, in more instances than many of these people may have thought
possible, to serve the interests of a broader group of people, including those
with little economic or political power.
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